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ABSTRACT 
 
Although Brazil is, historically, a catholic country, the Catholic Church is losing its members to 
the Protestant churches, mainly Pentecostal ones. Between 1940-2010, the number of 
Protestants increased from 2.6% to 20.2%. On the other hand, between the same period, the 
number of Catholics decreased from 95% to 68.5%. One of the consequences of this shift in the 
religious marketplace has been its impact in the political realm; more specifically, in the number 
of political candidates that have identified themselves as evangélicos. The presence of 
evangélicos in power seems to be the most studied facet of the growth of Pentecostalism in 
Brazil. However, the literature would also benefit from the investigation of the consequences of 
this shift occurring in the religious marketplace at the individual-level. Here, I use data from the 
LAPOP (2010) to investigate the effects of religiosity, paying special attention to Pentecostalism, 
on political behavior and attitudes. This dissertation is divided in three parts. First, I draw 
demographic patterns between members of the major religious groups (Catholics, Pentecostal 
and mainline Protestants). Second, I test how religious variables (religious affiliation, church 
attendance, and devoutness) affect different measures of political participation. And lastly, I 
analyze how religiosity affects individuals’ perceptions of democracy. My findings suggest that 
religion is mostly not correlated to political outcomes although devoutness shows to be a strong 
factor determining attitudes toward democracy. In the case of Brazil, socioeconomic variables 
are the strongest predictors of political outcomes. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PENTECOSTALISM IN BRAZIL 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
While advocates of secularization and modernization theories argued for most of the 20
th
 
century that the importance of religion as a political and social factor (i.e. religious authority) 
would decrease, and perhaps even fade away, in the modern world, it is clear that religion 
remains a relevant aspect of many societies.  
 Although empirical evidence shows that the traditional forms of religious participation 
(e.g. church attendance) are no longer as common as they once were among believers in many 
societies, many scholars have argued that this trend does not indicate that religion has become 
less important; instead, they note that religion has gone through a transformation process (Norris 
and Inglehart 2004; Fox 2008; Fox 2007; Steigenga 2001). As Fox writes “religion is, among 
other things, a complicated multifaceted social phenomena that is constantly changing, evolving, 
and adapting to an ever-changing environment. Thus some aspects of religion in some places are 
secularizing but other aspects of religion in other places are becoming more powerful and 
influential” (2008:30). While in some societies, secularization and modernization forces have 
challenged religion’s relevance as a social factor, in others, they have contributed to a 
“resurgence” or “revitalization” of religion1.  
                                                          
1
 For more read Fox’s second chapter on A World Survey of Religion and the State titled “The Question of Religion’s Role 
in Politics and Society.”  
2 
 
One of the cases that attest to Fox’s argument on the importance of religion is the current 
scenario in Latin American. As Gill (2002) comments, the political efforts of religious-affiliated 
candidates and movements in South America have been met with surprising success. In Peru, 
evangélicos
2were the key ingredient to President Alberto Fujimori’s 1990 successful presidential 
campaign. In Brazil, many religious-affiliated candidates have found their way not only into the 
local but also into the national elections as it is the case of previous presidential candidate 
Garotinho in 2002. In Guatemela, religious-affiliated candidates have not only participated in 
presidential election but have also won presidential elections twice (General Efrain Rios in 1982 
and Jorge Serrano Elias in 1990) in the last two decades (Hallum 2002).  
 At the individual level, we can also see the clear impact of the rapid growth of 
Pentecostalism pointing to what Steigenga and Cleary termed “the conversion of a continent” 
(2007). In 1991, the number of Protestants in Brazil represented approximately 9 percent of its 
population. By 2010, this number had increased to 22.2 percent. Conversely, the number of 
Catholics in 1991 represented 83 percent of Brazil’s population. In 2010, this number had 
dropped to 64.6 percent. In Chile, the percentage of evangélicos grew from 5.5 percent in 1960 
to 12.4 percent in 1992 (Oro and Seman 2000). In El Salvador, the percentage of evangélicos has 
grown from 16 percent in 1988 to 38 percent in 2010.
3
  
 This wave of conversion, specifically to Protestantism, in Latin America has drawn the 
attention of political scientists due to its political and social implications. However, a deficiency 
of this body of empirical research is its lack of attention to individual-level analysis. Most of this 
                                                          
2
 The term evangélico (evangelicals) is often used, in the Latin American context, to describe members of a wide 
range of Protestant groups, with diverging origins. The term includes classic Pentecostals, neo-Pentecostals, 
historical or mainstream Protestants, non-denominational Protestants and, at times, it also includes members of the 
Seventh-Day church (Steigenga and Cleary 2007; Freston 2006).  
3 According to data compiled from different sources available through the Religion-In-The Americas (RITA) 
database (http://prolades.com/)  
3 
 
body of work focuses on the aggregate dimensions of the political system – mainly the political 
party system and electoral outcomes (Bohn 2006; Borges 2009; Freston 2004; Machado and 
Mariz 2004; Oro 2001, 2003). The lack of attention to the individual-level of analysis is 
problematic for at least three reasons. First, multiple levels of analysis are the most effective way 
to achieve scientific understanding of political phenomena (McAdam et al. 1997); after all, the 
relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable is not fixed or 
constant across time. Variations in outcome are more likely to be a function of both individual-
level and macro-level factors. Second, as many scholars have argued and demonstrated 
(Robinson 1950), strong aggregate level relationships are not always reproduced at the individual 
level – problem known as ecological fallacy or bridging the gap between micro and macro level 
analysis. The question I ask here is the following: although empirical research shows that the 
Pentecostal movement has impacted politics at the aggregate level, what are the effects of this 
phenomenon at the individual level? And third, although it is a challenge to make the link 
between micro and macro patterns, seminal works by Almond and Verba (1963), Inglehart 
(1990), and Putnam (1993) have demonstrated that individual attitudes are crucial to the national 
context. For instance, attitudes such as interpersonal trust, life satisfaction, and support for the 
regime have been linked to the quality of democracy (Inglehart 1990, 1997; Putnam 1993; Lipset 
1993). Therefore, uncovering the effects of the wave of Pentecostalism on individual attitudes 
will help us understand the present national context more fully. Only so, one will be able to draw 
the link between the impact of Pentecostalism at the macro and micro levels.  
 
THE BRAZILIAN SCENARIO: GROWTH OF EVANGÉLICO 
 
4 
 
Just like the third wave of democratization washed the Latin America shores between the 
1970s-80s, a wave of Pentecostalism has also swept across Latin America, and to a lesser extent, 
the globe. According to the Anderson et al. (2010), there has been an estimated 700 percent 
increase in the number of Pentecostalism believers around the globe within the past thirty years. 
Korea had an estimate 5 percent of Protestant just after the Korean War. In 2006, Korea had over 
35 percent of its population claiming to be Protestant (Kim 2006). In China, despite persecution 
during the Cultural Revolution, the number of Protestants are said to be between 30-40 million 
(Oblau 2011). Pentecostalism has also achieve success in Africa where countries like Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania and Malawi have about 20 percent of its population professing to be belong to the 
Protestant movement.  
In Latin America, Brazil has been one of the leading countries in religious 
transformation. Although Brazil is historically a catholic country, the Catholic church is losing 
its members to the Protestant churches. According to the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e 
Estatística (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, IBGE), between 1940-2000, the 
number of evangelicos increased from 2.6% to 15.4%. On the other hand, between the same 
period, the number of Catholics decreased from 95% to 73.6%. Because of the nature of this 
religious transformation that has occurred in the past decades, it is more adequate to say that 
Brazil is going through a Protestant revival than a pure Pentecostal one.
4
 One of the 
consequences of this shift in the religious marketplace has been noticed more clearly in the 
political realm; more specifically, in the number of political candidates that have identified 
themselves as evangelicos. 
                                                          
4
Many authors have pointed out to the importance of differentiating between the term “evangelico” and 
“Pentecostal.” As Anderson et al. (2010:14) show, the term “pentecostalism” has been used by scholars of religion 
to refer to a wide range of churches with diverging doctrines, including catholic and protestant denominations. 
However, in the Brazilian context, the Pentecostal movement is made up mainly by Protestant believers and 
churches (Sinner 2007: 173; Oro and Samen 2000; Sanchis 1994).  
5 
 
Previous research shows that the number of evangelico members in the legislature has 
grown steadily since the 1980s (Fonseca 2002, Oro 2006). Figure 1 shows the number of 
evangelico officials in the lower chamber of the legislature, or Chamber of Deputies, between the 
periods of 1983-2010.   
 
Figure 1: Number of self- identified evangelico officials represented in the legislature
5
 
Legislature (period) Number of Evangelico Members 
1983-1986 12 
1987-1990 32 
1991-1994 23 
1995-1998 32 
1999-2002 51 
2003-2006 59 
2007-2010 32 
 
The presence of evangelicos in power seems to be the most studied facet of the growth of 
Pentecostalism in Brazil, as it is evident in the many studies published not only by Brazilian 
authors but also by scholars from other countries (Freston 2006; Maia 2006; Oro 2006; Borges 
2009; Smith 2009). Scholars have been mainly interested in how these evangelico officials have 
impacted the party system; more specifically, the possibility of the formation of an evangelico 
party (Borges 2009), the evangelical representation in the legislature (Oro 2003; Smilde 2003; 
Machado and Matriz 2004; Machado 2006; Goncalves 2011), and the impact of evangelical 
voters on electoral outcomes (Patterson 2005; Bohn 2006).  
Although the impact of this movement on the party system may be the most evident, the 
literature would also benefit from the investigation of this shift occurring in the religious 
marketplace and its consequences at the individual-level.  
                                                          
5
 Source: Borges, Tiago Daher (2009).  
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LINK BETWEEN RELIGIOSITY AND POLITICAL OUTCOMES 
 
As the classic works of Almond and Verba (1963) and Putnam (1993) have suggested, 
democratic government does not rely on formal institutions only; the democratic political culture 
of a country, or the endorsement of democratic values by citizens, is a strong determinant of the 
quality of democracy. The significant link between religion and politics emerges when religion is 
the primary, though not necessarily exclusive, foundation for moral values and political 
orientations (Leege and Welch 1989; Laymann 1997; Smidt 2008; Putnam and Campbell 2010). 
Religion, overtly or covertly, influences politics by encouraging and enforcing some attitudes 
and behaviors and by discouraging and disparaging others (Guth et al. 1997; Green 2003).  
Considering a two-dimensional conception of ideology (liberal versus conservative), the 
religious citizen is more likely to be ideologically conservative than the non-religious citizen 
(Hunsberger 1995; Schwartz and Huismans 1995, Saroglou et al. 2003). By ideology, I refer to 
what Huntington defined as a “system of ideas concerned with the distribution of political and 
social values” (1957:454). Religious people, across a variety of contexts, tend to place high 
importance on conservative values such as tradition and conformity and low importance on 
hedonistic and openness to change (Saroglou et al. 2004).  In a nutshell, a conservative favors 
limited governmental action in economic matters and opposes the expansion of personal 
freedoms; a liberal opposes both (Maddox and Lillie 1984; Swedlow 2008). As evidence of this 
expectation, that religious voters are more ideologically conservative than the non-religious 
voter, many scholars have found empirical support for this relationship between evangelicals and 
7 
 
political ideology, especially in the American context (Kellstedt and Smidt 1993; Leege and 
Kellstedt 1993; Wolfe 2000; Green 2007). 
Also, the religious citizen is more likely to be a member and vote for a candidate of a 
conservative party than the non-religious voter.  Previous studies investigating the link between 
religious beliefs and partisanship in the American context have found support to the strong 
correlation between conservative voters, and more specifically the evangelicals, to the 
Republican Party (Kellstedt and Smidt 1993; Calfano et al. 2005). One often cited example is 
that of the electoral outcome of the 2004 presidential election when the second largest voter gap 
was between Protestant (voting for Bush) and other religious groups (voting for Kerry) (Green 
2007).
6
 
As to the relationship between religious beliefs and democracy, most research focuses on 
the aggregate dimension of this relationship; more specifically, the link between the religious 
culture of a country and the type of regime.
7
 The works that do focus specifically on the 
relationship between individual religious beliefs and democratic values are not numerous and 
most focus on the American context. But some important attempts have been made. 
Greenawalt’s (1988) Religious Conviction and Political Choice is one of the earliest works in the 
analysis of the relationship between faith and individual political choices. Greenawalt’s main 
goal is to address whether people properly rely on their religious convictions in deciding what 
public policies to support.  The important contribution of this piece to this literature is that it 
points to the almost inevitable conflicts between religious convictions and the rationale of 
political choices.   
                                                          
6
 This finding is based on data from the 2004 National Election Pool (NEP) 
7
 Some examples are: Diamond et al. (2005) and Jelen and Wilcox (2002). And more recently, because of world 
events, there has been a greater focus on the link between Islam and the democracy.  
8 
 
All these previous findings paint the picture of the religious voter as ideologically more 
conservative and more likely to identify themselves with, and vote for, a conservative party than 
other voters. But are religious voters more active in politics than others? One of the most recent 
large N analyses presents inconclusive results. Norris and Inglehart (2004) study the impact of 
secularization on a variety of indicators, one of the being religiosity, and draw their findings 
from data including 191 nations including periods from 1981-2001. Norris and Inglehart (2004) 
conclude that “different ways of measuring religious participation generate contrasting results” 
(192). For example, the authors find that church attendance is correlated to significant lower than 
average levels of political discussion and interest, to lower levels of social trust, and to less 
participation in some of the more radical forms of political protest. That is, religiosity, measured 
in terms of church attendance, is negatively related to higher levels of political participation. On 
the other hand, when religiosity is measured in terms of membership in religious organizations, 
the relationship between religiosity and all these indicators changes. That is, individuals that 
belong to religious organizations display relatively high levels of civic behavior and attitudes. 
The authors suggest that the contrasting results are plausible. In their interpretation, simply 
attending religious services does not seem to make one politically active; however, the more 
demanding activity of joining a religious organization seems to be conducive to political 
activism.  
 
THE FOCUS OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
Given this important role that religion can exercise in the political realm, the overarching 
question I seek to answer here is what are the individual-level political implications of the 
9 
 
explosive growth of Pentecostalism in Brazil? How do Pentecostals differ from other religious 
groups? Does the unique growth of Pentecostals, and consequently the movement’s political 
power, also translate into a unique pattern of political engagement at the individual level? 
Ultimately, I am interested in knowing whether different religious affiliations translate into 
different political orientations and behavior. Therefore here, Pentecostal will be compared to 
believers belonging to the other major religious groups: Catholicism, mainline Protestantism, and 
Spiritism.
8
 Catholics, mainline Protestants, and Spiritists account for 61.4, 13.7, and 2.3 percent 
of the population respectively. Below I briefly describe the religious groups examined here.  
 
PENTECOSTALS 
 
Pentecostalism emerged in the twentieth century as a movement within Protestantism 
which gave emphasis to the Christian way of life resembling that of the New Testament. The 
new version of Protestantism brought back to the core of their faith phenomena such as speaking 
in tongues, divine healing, expulsion of demons, and prophecy.  According to Paul Freston 
(2004; 2001), the prominent scholar in the field of religion in Latin America, Pentecostalism has 
only been adopted by a minority of Protestants in the developed West; however, he estimates that 
Pentecostalism represents the dominant form of Protestantism in Latin America.  
In Brazil, Pentecostals account for 60 percent of the 42.3 million Protestants. Pentecostals 
churches in Brazil are characterized by its emphasis on speaking in tongues, literal interpretation 
of the bible, divine healing, prosperity gospel, and spiritual warfare. The three largest 
                                                          
8
 Non-religious are also included in order to determine if there are underlying differences between religious and non-
religious voters. Non-religious account for approximately 8 percent of the Brazilian population.  
10 
 
Pentecostals churches are the Assembléia de Deus, Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus and 
Congregação Cristã no Brasil. 
Assembléia de Deus 
 Founded in 1910 by two Swedish missionaries in the city of Belém, Para was the first 
Pentecostal church in Brazil. The two Swedish missionaries, Gunnar Vingren and Daniel Berg, 
had arrived in Belém to help a local Baptist church. However, after performing healing miracles 
and encouraging members to speak in tongues, the two missionaries were expelled from the 
church. Other members followed them to start an independent church which they named 
“Assembly of God.” What distinguishes the Assembly of God denomination from the other 
Pentecostal denominations is its emphasis on the Holy Spirit. Although, they believe in the 
baptism of the Holy Spirit, this belief is not the most important doctrine taught in these churches. 
Today, it is estimated that the Assembly of God churches have approximately 12.3 million 
members which makes this denomination the largest protestant church in Brazil.   
 
Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus(IURD) 
 The IURD was founded in July of 1977 by pastor Edir Macedo in Rio de Janeiro. The 
IURD church is well-known for its focus on prosperity gospel, exorcism, and healing ministries 
(Freston 2005). Interestingly, although the social composition of this denomination is lower than 
that of most of other Pentecostal churches (i.e. for instance, members from the IURD often have 
lower income and schooling levels than other Protestant members belonging to different 
Pentecostal churches),the IURD is a wealthy church owning Brazil’s third largest television 
network and raising over 1.4 billion annually. In terms of missionaries, the IURD is the leader in 
numbers of missionaries sent to world with approximately 2,500 individuals sent to all 
11 
 
continents. Today, it is estimated that IURD has over five thousand temples with membership of 
approximately 1.3 million. 
 
Congregação Cristã no Brasil 
 The Congregação Cristã no Brasil was established in 1910 in São Paulo by Luigi 
Francescon, an Italian missionary. Francescon was born in Udine, Italy in 1866. After 
completing his military duties, he migrated to the United States in 1890. In March of that year, 
Fracescon was introduced to Christianity and in that same year founded the Italian Presbyterian 
church. In 1907, Francescon joined the Pentecostal movement and was mentored by William H. 
Durham, the key leader of the Pentecostal movement in Chicago. In March of 1909, Francescon 
arrived in Brazil and in 1910 established the first Congregação Cristã no Brasil. Today, the 
membership of the Congregação Cristã no Brasil is of approximately 2.3 million.  
 
MAINLINE PROTESTANTS 
 
 Most mainline protestant denominations arrived in Brazil in the second half of the 19
th
 
century through Presbyterian, Methodist and Baptist missionaries coming from the United States. 
Since its arrival, these traditional denominations appealed more to those belonging to the social 
and cultural elite of the country. Many scholars believe that this focus on converting members of 
the elite is the reason why the traditional denominations never blossomed in Brazil (Mendonça 
1989). Amongst the three, Baptists are the biggest group with approximately 3.7 million 
members. The Presbyterian church comes second with approximately 920,000 members. 
12 
 
Methodists are the smallest group within the mainline Protestant tradition with approximately 
250,000 members.  
 
CATHOLICS 
 
 Up to the 1970s Catholicism was not only the religion of the majority but also had virtual 
monopoly in the religious marketplace. Catholicism was brought to Brazil in the 1500s by 
Portuguese colonizers. Therefore, it was never an indigenous faith since before Portuguese 
explorers arrived in South America, the natives had their own folk beliefs. And although 
Catholicism was then the religion endorsed by the state, some adopted, some rejected and many 
creolized the faith. The creolization of Catholicism meant that the Catholic faith was divided in 
how it was practiced; there was the formal Catholicism of the upper classes and clergy, and the 
folk or popular Catholicism practiced by the masses in which traditional Catholic practices 
where mixed with indigenous practices and beliefs (Smith and Prokopy 1999). As a result, 
members of the popular Catholic Church tended to “ignore the three persons of the trinity in 
favor of the Virgin Mary and a myriad of saints” (Chesnut 2003:23). To Chesnut (2003) what 
distinguishes (popular) Catholicism in Brazil from the traditional Catholicism (practiced in 
Europe for instance) is its polytheistic aspect. Chesnut (2003) observes that for the  “great 
majority of popular Catholics, God is a remote figure who rarely receives the kind of intimate 
prayers and petitions that are directed to the saints and virgins” (105). Another distinctive 
characteristic of Brazilian Catholicism is the contractual relationship known as promessa (or 
promise). In this relationship, believers promise to “pay” for a miracle performed by the Virgin 
13 
 
or saints by performing sacrificial rituals (most often this sacrificial ritual would take the form of 
a procession or pilgrimage).  
 One of the most important developments that have taken place within the Catholic 
Church in the couple decades is a movement known as Charismatic Renewal which, some would 
argue, is a direct response to the Protestant growth in Brazil. Like the Pentecostal movement, the 
Charismatic Renewal movement is also centered on the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Therefore, many 
Charismatic Catholics also believe in the baptism in the Spirit and speaking in tongues. This new 
emphasis can be seen very clearly in the way Masses are conduct. Cleary (2007) says of the 
Masses:  
The unexpected innovation of the Brazilian Charismatic Renewal has been priest 
performers. None exceed Padre Marcelo Rossi. He looks like the incarnation of an 
evangelical televangelist, only better. He has drawn two and half million persons to a 
Charismatic celebration, needing a race track because a soccer stadium was not large 
enough… In Rossi’s case, he incorporated singing and movement into both stadium and 
daily Mass. He became a singing star. His CDs have risen to the top charts. He also 
dances, in the sense of moving to the music. (165-66) 
 
 Not only the way Masses are conduct have changed but also, more importantly, the 
message of the churches that have subscribed to the movement have focused on encouraging the 
public to live their lives according to guidance of the Holy Spirit, to be committed to God, and 
live righteously (Cleary 2007). Although Charismatic Catholic churches resemble much the 
Protestant Pentecostal churches, the dividing line that separates these two groups is the centrality 
of the Virgin Mary (Chesnut 2003). To Charismatic Catholics, the Virgin is the center, more than 
any other element, of the Catholic faith. In 2003, the number of Charismatic Catholics was 
estimated to be between 8-10 million (Chesnut 2003). 
 
 
14 
 
SPIRITISTS  
Spiritism (sometimes referred to as Kardecism) emerged from the writings of Allan 
Kardec
9
, a French philosopher and teacher, in the 19
th
 century. Kardec taught chemistry, physics, 
anatomy, and astronomy in Paris before he got interested in spirits. In 1848, in Hydesville, New 
York, a Methodist family claimed that they could communicate with spirits through “table-
tapping;” basically, people sat around the table and asked questions which, in turn, were 
answered by the spirits using the table as an instrument. The story of this phenomenon reached 
the ears of Kardec, and although he was skeptical at first, in 1855 he witnessed “table-tapping” 
for the first time.  This event marks Kardec’s investigation of spirits. With the help of mediums, 
Kardec started examining the spirits’ answers to questions regarding the problems and purpose 
of human life.
10
 
In 1857, Kardec published “The Spirits Book,” work that gave birth to Spiritism.11 In The 
Spirits Book, Kardec addresses questions regarding God, the universe, spirits (and how they 
interact with men), laws that guide human life, and the present and future life (Kardec 1944). 
The book is a codification of answers (a little over 1,000) that the author received from many 
different spirits.  
One of the most distinguishing features of spiritualism is the belief in reincarnation as a 
means for spiritual progress. Spiritists believe that spirits are immortal and the goal of life on 
earth is to enhance one’s spirit – in knowledge and capacity. Therefore, death is just the 
detachment of the spirit from the body; not the death of the spirit. After death, the spirit keeps on 
living until it reincarnates in another physical body.  
                                                          
9
 Allan Kardec’s real name was Hippolyte Leon Denizard Rivail.  
10
 According to Allan Kardec (1861), a medium is someone who feels the presence of spirits.  
11
 And these later works, by Allan Kardec, also contributed to the Spiritualist doctrine: The Mediums Book (1861), 
The Gospel According to Spiritism (1864), Heanven and Hell (1865), and The Genesis According to Spiritism 
(1868).  
15 
 
It is important to mention that Spiritism has its foundations on Christianity. Spirits accept 
many of the doctrines presented in the bible.
12
 As to their most distinguishing claim, Spiritists 
believe that eight bible passages justify their belief in reincarnation. And like Christians, 
Spiritists also believe in the person of Jesus. However, contrary to Christian thought, Spiritists 
believe that Jesus was not God, nor a god, but was the only perfect spirit to walk on earth.  
In summary, Spiritism’s goal is to understand the nature, origin and destiny of spirits 
(Kardec 1944). Many Spiritists would not consider Spiritism a religion, but a doctrine. Others 
would say it is a religion without rituals. In Brazil, most Spiritists also associate themselves with 
one of the traditional religions; in most cases, Catholicism. According to Monteiro (2001), 95.4 
percent of Spirits were once Catholic or still associate with Catholicism. There approximately 
3.8 million Spiritists in Brazil.  
 
THE PLAN OF THE DISSERTATION  
  
 This dissertation is organized as the following. Chapter 2 investigates the socioeconomic 
identity of the Protestant Pentecostal voter. The goal is to find out whether the Pentecostal 
believer is unique. Using data from the 2002 Brazilian Electoral Study (ESEB)
13
 and the Latin 
American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) 2008-2010, I draw comparisons between the 
socioeconomic background patterns of believers belonging to the main religious groups. Chapter 
3 investigates the link between religion and political behavior. The main question address in this 
chapter is how religion affects one’s likelihood of engaging in politics. I want to know whether 
the evangelico presence in the legislature translates into a unique pattern of political behavior by 
                                                          
12
 Such as the existence of God (and one God only), divine justice, the emphasis on good works, and etc.  
13
 Used in Bohn (2004) 
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Pentecostal Protestants. In other words, are Pentecostals more politically engaged than the other 
members of belonging to other religious groups? Chapter 4 aims to explain the impact of religion 
on individuals’ perspective of democracy. More specifically, I will be examining differences in 
levels of political tolerance and support for democratic practices among members of the main 
religious groups. Lastly, Chapter 5 provides a review of the findings and implications of this 
study to this literature.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
PENTECOSTAL PROTESTANT IDENTITY: WHO ARE THE 
PENTECOSTALS?  
 
According to the recent numbers released by the Fundacao Getulio Vargas (Getulio Vargas 
Foundation, FGV), the number of Protestants in Brazil represents over 20 percent of the 
population.
14
  If the projections are accurate, by 2020 this percentage will increase to 
approximately 50 percent. To a historically catholic country, where Catholics used to represent 
95 percent of the population up to the 1940s, the numbers are unprecedented. Who are these 
individuals? What are the commonalities between them? The purpose of this chapter is to 
address these questions by drawing comparisons between the main three religious groups: 
Catholics, mainline Protestants and Pentecostal Protestants.  
 
 
DECLINE IN CATHOLICISM  
 
 In order to understand the rapid and unforeseen growth of Protestants in Brazil, a good 
point of departure is the decline in Catholicism and consequently conversion to Protestantism. 
Since the 1940s, the Catholic Church has been losing members; many of those left the Catholic 
faith to join the Protestant movement. According to the IBGE, between the years of 1940-2010, 
the number of Catholics decreased from 95 percent to 64.4 percent while the number of 
Protestants increased from 2.6 percent to 22.2 percent. The simultaneous decrease in the number 
of Catholics and increase in the number of Protestants in Brazil represent the tip of the iceberg of 
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the grand religious transformation occurring in Latin America; phenomenon referred to by some 
scholars as “conversion of a continent.”15 
 
Theories explaining this religious change not only in Brazil but also in Latin America 
have been organized in terms of supply-side and demand-side explanations. Supply-side 
explanations focus on the opportunities and restrictions religious organizations and its leaders 
face in the religious marketplace. (Finke and Iannaccone 1993; Warner 1993). These 
explanations, originated from economic models, view religion as a product, leaders and religious 
organizations as suppliers, and believers as consumers. The words of Finke and Iannaccone 
illustrate the main assumption of supply-side explanations. 
 
The market model views churches and their clergy as religious producers who choose the 
characteristics of their product and the mains of marketing it. Consumers in turn choose 
what religion, if any, they will accept and how extensively they will participate in it. In a 
competitive environment, a particular religious firm will flourish only if it provides a 
product as least as attractive as its competitors.  
 (Finke and Iannaccone 1993:28) 
 
According to supply-side explanations then, factors such as denominational competition 
and state regulation of religious activity and institutions are major determinants of levels of the 
public’s participation in religious activities. On the other hand, demand-side explanations focus 
on the needs, perceptions, and tastes of religious consumers. The processes of modernization, 
industrialization, and secularization are often cited phenomena in explaining how social and 
structural change affect the demand for religion – or the needs and perceptions of individuals 
toward religion. For instance, many authors have emphasized how the changes brought by these 
processes, secularization and industrialization, have caused a decrease in demand for religion and 
religious authority (Chaves 1994; Norris and Inglehart 2004). The assumption is that rising levels 
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 For more discussion on the topic, see Timothy J. Steigenga and Edward L. Cleary, Conversion of a Continent: 
Contemporary Religious Change in Latin America (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2007). 
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of urbanization, education, and wealth all contribute to the decreasing influence of religious 
authority in society.  
Supply-side and Demand-side Explanations and the Case of Brazil  
 
 Both set of explanations work together to explain the Latino scenario. While supply-side 
explanations point to the Catholic Church’s contentment with the status quo and the growing 
religious pluralism in the region as causes of the decline of Catholicism, demand-side 
explanations emphasize the challenges and ideas brought up by modernization as causes of the 
growth of Protestantism.  
Gill (1998) writes that the Catholic Church was the only supplier of religious services for 
nearly five centuries (up to the mid- 1800s), position that provided the Catholic Church with 
virtual monopoly over religion in Latin America. However, as many scholars point out, the 
Catholic Church was a lazy monopolist (Finke and Stark 1992; Smith and Prokopy 1999; Levine 
2009). In the words of Gill (1999:73), “it is difficult to think of Catholicism as being a 
proselytizing religion [in Latin America]; with a virtual monopoly over the religious market, its 
mission to gain adherents was more or less complete.” 
The problem with monopoly is that the church stops supplying its flock with their needs. 
Meaning, religious monopoly breeds lazy leadership (Finke and Stark 1992). When religious 
monopoly exists, the monopolist leadership becomes complacent even to the point of taking their 
members or congregations for granted. In the case of the Catholic Church, since no other 
religious movement presented itself as a threat to the status quo, the leadership had no incentive 
to be active or innovative. Evangelization is an ongoing process; a lack of evangelism, or the 
continuous preaching of the faith, discourages members to continue to be committed to the faith. 
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The monopoly of the Brazilian Catholic Church did just that. Perhaps the lack of commitment to 
evangelization can be seen through the extreme lack of clergy. According to Barrett (1982), the 
number of priests in Latin America is approximately 1.9 priests per 10,000 Catholics while in the 
U.S and Great Britain the numbers are 9.8 and 10.5 respectively.  
 Another related cause to the decline of Catholicism, from the supply-side explanation, is 
the multiplication of religious choices, or religious pluralism. According to the religious market 
model, whereas monopoly leads to complacent monopolies, a free religious marketplace leads to 
an “energetic competition between churches [and] expands the supply of religious ‘products,’ 
thereby mobilizing religious activism among the public” (Norris and Inglehart 2004:95). In the 
Brazilian case, the monopoly of the Catholic Church was most threatened in the 1980s due to 
democratic transition, and consequently, the political reforms that empowered other religious 
groups. The new found political freedom accentuated religious pluralism and competition by 
providing new and old churches a variety of ways to make their message heard and also to gain 
access to the state (Serbin 1999).  
In the midst of this new religious competition, two different movements emerged 
challenging  the Catholic monopoly: Protestantism and Afro-Brazilian religions (Patterson 
2005). In the case of the Afro-Brazilian religions, umbanda and candomble were acquiring more 
attention of the public although less than 1 percent of the population identified themselves as 
belonging to those three religious groups combined. As to the Protestant movement, Pentecostal 
denominations quickly gained prominence in the public sphere. A prime example is the 
establishment of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (Igreja Universal do Reino de 
Deus, IURD). The IURD was established in 1977 by evangelist Edir Marcedo and by the mid-
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1990s it had purchased the third largest Brazilian TV network (TV Record) and an average of $ 1 
billion in tithes per year.  
 As Catholicism faces the challenge imposed by the political reforms and, consequently, 
the increasing religious pluralism, another set of factors, linked to demand-side explanations, 
also shook the scope of influence of the Catholic Church: people’s diversifying and fluctuating 
needs (Doogers 2001; Willems 2006). Broadly, the source of change in needs can be organized 
as coming from either structural changes – known as “anomie” thesis – or an individual’s 
personal choice for a different set of values.  The anomie thesis suggests that changes brought by 
modernization (the loss of traditional community, urbanization, economic growth, and etc.) 
cause a sense of uncertainty or a disruption of traditional patterns that makes individuals more 
likely to see religion as an attractive option, or an adaptive mechanism. In the case of Brazil, 
Protestantism was the more attractive option for many affected by these structural changes. 
Another possible cause of conversion to Protestantism is the individual’s personal choice for a 
new set of norms. The need for a new set of norms can originate from a big pool of reasons 
varying from people’s needs to find answers to transcendental questions to affinities with 
individualism and capitalist values associated with the Protestant faith (Heirich 1977; Seman 
2000). 
Andrew Chesnut’s (1997) investigation of the enormous success of Protestant 
Pentecostalism in Brazil illustrates the argument put forth by the anomie thesis. Conducting 
ninety life history interviews with believers belonging to three different Pentecostal churches in 
the Amazonian city of Belem, between the years of 1993 and 1994, Chesnut finds that 
conversion to Protestantism is linked to the promise of faith healing many Protestant churches 
promote. Many individuals turned to Protestantism after they, or a family member, experienced 
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some type of illness or life-threatening condition. Chesnut concludes that the message of healing 
power echoes with the masses’ needs.16 Emilio Willems’ investigation of conversion in Brazil 
and Chile point to the other set of explanations – to the individual’s personal choice for a new set 
of norms. As a result of his field work, Willems finds that many of the life stories he collected 
linked conversion to Protestantism to a feeling of dissatisfaction with life or search for better a 
spiritual life.  
Other authors’ investigation of conversion to Protestantism in Latin America also point to 
this same pattern in conversion. Rebecca Bomann (1999) studies the conversion experiences of 
believers in Bogota, Columbia. Bomann spends a year travelling and interviewing individuals 
that were raised Catholic but at some point in their lives turned to Protestantism. After extensive 
field work, Bomann concludes that there are basically three explanations for conversion: 
structural change, and social and spiritual needs. As to structural changes, the author points to 
experiences of massive urbanization and rapid modernization which disrupts traditional family 
structures and ways of life where the poor are the most affected. In terms of social needs, the 
Protestant Church provides ways to supply for the members’ needs for material needs, social 
networking, and emotional support. Lastly, the need for spiritual fulfillment also draws people to 
the Protestant faith. Bomann describes Latin America as defined by a passionate and spiritual 
culture where the practice of divination, superstition, folk religion, and saint worship are all 
common practice. Therefore, it is no surprise that the Protestant church, specially the Pentecostal 
one, has captivated many with its many supernatural experiences and manifestations.  
 Explanations stemming from both, supply-side and demand-side theory, offer valuable 
insights to our understanding of the decline of Catholicism. While endogenous developments 
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in the Brazilian context see Marcelo Natividade (2006), Victor Valla (2002) and Francisco Cartaxo Rolim (1985).  
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hurt the Catholic Church’s scope of influence, other exogenous factors such as political reforms 
and people’s diversifying needs also contributed to the decline in membership in the Catholic 
Church and perhaps, inversely, contributed to the growth of Protestantism. Next, I will turn to a 
brief discussion of the history of the Protestant Pentecostal movement in Brazil.  
 
THE PROTESTANT PENTECOSTAL MOVEMENT: THE WAVES OF PROTESTANTISM 
 
In a better effort to understand how the Protestant movement sprung up in Latin America, 
scholars often explain the phenomenon as successive waves of evangelism.  The Protestant roots 
in Latin America date back to the early 1800s. In 1810, Brazil and Britain signed a commercial 
treaty that opened up the doors for foreign trade and, consequently, allow for cultural exchange.  
More importantly, the agreement guaranteed religious freedom for new immigrants. Many of 
those that migrated to Brazil were members of the Anglican Church. This period marks the first 
successful introduction of the faith in the region – or the first wave. However, it is important to 
note that these Protestants immigrants practiced their faith as means for preserving their cultural 
identity instead of a means for spreading the faith to non-believers. Therefore, the impact of 
these first Protestants in the Brazilian religious’ landscape was very limited.  
The second of wave of Protestantism began in the early 1900s as the result of an 
evangelical movement originated in the United States. This earlier revival evangelical movement 
was also the beginning of Pentecostalism, first seen in Topeka, Kansas, in 1901, and most 
famously in Azusa Street, Los Angeles, five years later. The movement was transported to Brazil 
mainly through the initiative of two Swedish missionaries that had been living the United States: 
Gunnar Vingren and Daniel Berg. After a revelation in a church in Chicago, where Vingren and 
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Berg received the word they should spread the faith to an unknown place, the two missionaries 
packed up and  arrived in Para, Brazil in November of 1910 to establish one of the first Brazilian 
Pentecostal churches, the Assembly of God. Around the 1920s, Vingren and Berg started 
ordaining local pastors and in the early 1930s, they transferred the leadership of the church to 
Brazilian leaders. Almost simultaneously, the arrival of Luis Francescon in Sao Paulo also 
majorly contributed to the spread of Protestantism in Brazil. Francescon founded the first 
Pentecostal church in Brazil – Congregacao Crista –  in Sao Paulo in 1910 after he was expelled 
from the Presbyterian Church of Bras. The significance of this second wave of Protestantism is 
not only that it marks the beginning of the Pentecostal movement in Brazil but also lays the 
foundation for the formation of independent and local churches (Vasquez 1998).  As Read 
(1965) shows, by the 1950s, the membership of the Assembly of God and the Congregacao 
Crista had jumped over to 120,000 and 132,000 respectively.  
The third wave of Protestantism occurred between 1950s and mid-1970s. During this 
period, many Pentecostal churches were formed including the Igreja do Evangelho 
Quadrangular, Brasil para Cristo, and Deus e Amor. The founder of Brasil para Cristo (Brazil for 
Christ), Manoel de Mello, was a leader trained in the Assembly of God tradition and used the 
mass media and religious rallies to proselytize the faith. As result, Brasil para Cristo became the 
first large Pentecostal church in Brazil. This strategy was also adopted by other Pentecostal 
churches and, since then, Pentecostalism has experienced spectacular growth. Today, the largest 
Pentecostal church in Brazil is the IURD, founded in 1977, with over five million members and 
13,000 churches.
17
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THE PROTESTANT PENTECOSTAL BELIEVER: THE SOCIOECONOMIC 
BACKGROUND 
 
What distinguishes the mainline Protestant church from the Pentecostal Protestant 
church? The purpose of the Pentecostal movement was to reorganize the faith so that the modern 
church could resemble more what the “first” church looked like – as described in the bible (in the 
book of Acts). Due to this reshaping of doctrine, the most common traits of the Pentecostal 
church are speaking in tongues, emphasis on baptism of the spirit, divine healing, expulsion of 
demons, and prophecy. These traits make the Pentecostal Protestant church distinct from the 
mainline Protestant church.  
The main goal of this chapter is to describe the socioeconomic identity of those that make 
up the membership of the Pentecostal church. Who are these individuals? Are they unique? Or 
are they very similar to the rest of the population?  
 
Background  
  
 It has been argued that Pentecostal Protestantism often makes its greatest wins among the 
most disenfranchised sects of the population (Freston 2001; Montero and Almeida 2000; Chesnut 
1997; Steward-Gambino and Wilson 1997; Pierucci and Prandi 1995; Mariz 1994; Fernandes 
1992). The argument makes sense when one analyzes the way Pentecostalism was introduced in 
Brazil. As mentioned before, Pentecostalism was brought to Brazil through international 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
blamed; (3) prosperity philosophy. For better information on the topic in the Brazilian context see Birman, Patricia 
(2007) and Mariano (1999). 
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missionaries; mainly the two Swedish and Italian missionaries. Vingren and Berg arrived in the 
state of Para with the purpose of proselytizing the Protestant faith. Upon their arrival in the rural 
Para, the two missionaries were sheltered by a Baptist minister who spoke English. Berg and 
Vingren spent months participating in the activities of a small Baptist church until they were 
excommunicated due to their message of baptism in the Holy Spirit and faith healing. After their 
expulsion, Berg and Vingren organized their own church in 1911 (the Assembly of God), made 
up by locals that were so economically disprivileged they could not afford to rent a worship 
place on their own (Chesnut 1997). Berg then drew from his own funds –accumulated through 
bible selling and a job as a smelter at the Port Company of Para – to keep the ministry alive.  
 By 1914, the number of members of the newly formed Pentecostal church was 
approximately 190. By the mid-1920s, the number in membership had increased beyond the 
temple’s physical capacity of twelve hundred seats. By the 1930s, the Assembly of God had 
founded two other churches and registered over a thousand of believers. Seeing that the 
movement had been consolidated in the north of Brazil, the headquarters of the Assembly of God 
was transferred to Rio de Janeiro. Meanwhile, Luis Francescon was having the same effect on 
the Paulista Presbyterians that Vingren and Berg had on the northern Baptists (Chesnut 1997). 
While we lack data and information to know what the congregation founded by Francescon 
looked like, it is clear that the members of the first Assembly of God came from the poor areas of 
Belem, Para. In Chesnut’s (1997) account of Berg and Vingren’s efforts to win converts in Para, 
the author writes: 
 
To win converts to their Pentecostal faith, Berg and Vingren spent much of their time 
making house calls on the sick. Berg reports receiving calls at their basement room after 
midnight from distraught relatives of the infirm. Even if the afflicted eventually 
succumbed to malaria, yellow fever, or another tropical malady, the therapeutic value of 
prayer, anointment with oil, laying on of hands proved real. With little access to the city’s 
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precarious health care facilities and neglected by the Catholic church, many ill 
Belenenses and their families came to the Assembly of God as a last resort.  
(Chesnut 1997:28)                  
 
 The success of Pentecostalism among the poor and less educated can be better understood 
when one contrasts the evangelization approach of mainline Protestant missionaries to that of the 
Pentecostal Protestant missionaries. First, it is important to emphasize the fact that most of the 
early Brazilian Pentecostal churches were formed by individuals that had left their Baptist 
congregations. After Berg and Vingren were expelled from the Baptist church they used to serve, 
the two missionaries and seventeen others pursued a clear and intentional strategy of poaching 
members of the Baptist churches in their region.  Second, Baptist missionaries were highly 
involved with the Brazilian upper class due to their similarities in socioeconomic class, racial 
bias and perhaps even political views (Premark 2011). Third, Pentecostalism gave Brazilians the 
opportunity to be in charge. While the leadership of the Catholic Church and mainline Protestant 
churches was in the hands of mostly foreign priests and foreign missionaries respectively, the 
leadership of Pentecostal churches could be held by anyone. In other words, the requirements to 
be a pastor for a Pentecostal church were much less extensive than those to be a pastor for a 
mainline Protestant church. All of these factors contributed to the success of Pentecostalism 
among the masses. As Premark (2011:15) writes, the masses “embraced Pentecostalism because 
[Pentecostalism] embraced them.”  
As story tells, Pentecostalism did spread out first amongst those with lower 
socioeconomic status. However, is Pentecostalism still a movement of the most disfranchised? 
According to data belonging to the year of 2002, the short answer to this question is “yes”, 
although a deeper comparison of the socioeconomic status among members of different religious 
groups reveals that members of the three main religious groups and those not affiliated to a 
religion are very similar in their socioeconomic background. Using data from the 2002 Brazilian 
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Electoral Study (ESEB), Bohn (2004) describes the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
Brazilian Protestant. Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of income by religious affiliation.  
As data from the ESEB 2002 show, the monthly income of most members of Protestant 
churches (48.4 percent) was equal to minimum wage. Approximately 67 percent of Protestants 
received a maximum of twice the minimum wage monthly. Only about 8.9 percent of Protestants 
came from the group that earned six or more times the minimum wage.  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Distribution of Income by Religious Affiliation (ESEB 2002) 
 
 
Source: Bohn (2004) using data from the ESEB 2002 
 
 A closer look at Figure 1.1 points to interesting similarities between Catholics and 
Protestants. The monthly income of most members of the Catholic Church (51.8 percent) was 
equal to minimum wage. Approximately 77.3 percent of Catholics received a maximum of twice 
the minimum wage monthly. The percentage of Catholics that earned six or more times 
minimum wage was of 8.8. Also, the distribution of income between Catholics and Protestants is 
very similar to that of members of the Afro-religion group. Most members of the Afro-religion 
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group (54.5 percent) also earned a monthly income of minimum wage and only 9.9 percent 
earned six or more times the minimum wage.  
 As it is clear, most members of the three largest religious groups (Catholics, Protestant, 
and Afro) earned a monthly income equal to minimum wage in 2002. One is tempted then, to 
think that religion, in general, is an option of the poor. However, that would be an incorrect 
assessment since approximately 46 percent of those that did not associate themselves with a 
religious group also earned a monthly income equal to minimum wage.  
What stands out from data shown in Figure 1.1 is the distribution of income between 
members of Spiritism. While most members of three largest religious groups earned a monthly 
income equal to minimum wage, only 30 percent of the practitioners of Spiritism earned that 
same wage. Also, 36.8 percent of Spiritists earned six or more the minimum wage; number 
significantly higher than those for Catholics, Protestants and Afro.  
 Data from ESEB 2002 also allow us to analyze differences in income between mainline 
Protestants and Pentecostal Protestants. As Figure 1.2 shows, there were significant differences 
between the distribution of income between mainline and Pentecostal Protestants. In 2002, 70.3 
percent of Pentecostal Protestants earned a monthly income up to two times the minimum wage 
while the percentage for mainline Protestants was 58.3. However, the sharpest difference 
between these two groups relied on the percentage of members that earned six or more times the 
minimum wage. While 6.8 percent of Pentecostal Protestants earned six or more times the 
minimum wage, the percentage for mainline Protestants was 16.7. These numbers show that 
mainline Protestants were wealthier than Pentecostal Protestants. These findings suggest that 
following hypothesis: 
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H1: There is a positive relationship between low levels of income and 
Protestantism   
H1.1: Mainline Protestants are slightly wealthier than Pentecostal Protestants  
H2: There are no significant differences in income between Catholics and 
Protestants  
 
Figure 1.2: Distribution of Income Between Mainline and Pentecostal Protestants 
 
 
Source: Bohn (2004) using data from the ESEB 2002 
 
 
 Next, we turn to the analysis between religious affiliation and education. Given the 
history of Brazilian Pentecostalism, one is tempted to make the conclusion that, just like income, 
lower levels of education is positively linked to Protestantism. Data from the 2002 ESEB 
confirms that suspicion. Figure 1.3 presents the relationship between levels of education and 
religious affiliation.  
 In terms of education, Catholics and Protestants have a very similar profile. The percent 
of Catholics that did not complete primary school is 58.1 while for Protestants is 54. The 
percentage of individuals that have some or a college degree is 6.3 and 5.6 for Catholics and 
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Figure 1.3: Levels of Education by Religious Affiliation 
 
 
Source: Bohn (2004) using data from the ESEB 2002 
 
Figure 1.4: Levels of Education Between Mainline and Pentecostal 
Protestants 
 
 
Source: Bohn (2004) using data from the ESEB 2002 
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some degree of secondary education; only 27 percent of Spiritists had not completed primary 
school. Also, when it comes to higher education, there was a significant contrast between 
Spiritism and the other religions. Approximately 24 percent of Spiritists had some degree or 
college experience while the percentage for Catholics, Protestants, and members of the Afro-
religions were 6.3, 5,5, and 4.5 respectively. 
Another important contrast to make is between mainline Protestants and Pentecostal 
Protestants. Once again, we see Pentecostal Protestants scoring lower than mainline Protestants 
on the variable analyzed. According to figure 1.4, the number of Pentecostals Protestant (60.8 
percent) that did not finish primary education is almost double the number of mainline 
Protestants (33.7 percent) that did not finish primary education. Most mainline Protestants (44.6 
percent) had some degree of secondary education. Also, the difference in college experience 
between these two groups was significant. While only 2.2 percent of Pentecostal Protestants had 
some degree of college experience, approximately 16 percent of mainline Protestants had the 
same experience. From these findings, we can generate the following relationships:  
 
H3: There is a positive relationship between low levels of education and 
Protestantism 
H3.1: Mainline Protestants are more likely to display higher levels of education 
than Pentecostal Protestants.  
H4: There are no significant differences in levels of education between Catholics 
and Protestants.  
 
Data from 2002 show Pentecostalism as movement embraced mostly by those of lower 
socioeconomic status, is the present scenario the same? Using one of the most recent surveys 
done in Brazil, the LAPOP (for the years of 2008 and 2010), I will analyze the socioeconomic 
characteristics of the current Pentecostal Protestant.  
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The Current Scenario  
 
 In order to test the independent effects of socioeconomic variables on religious 
affiliation, I first use a means comparison analysis (ANOVA) for the periods of 2008 and 2010. 
Next I also present the results of a logit model predicting Pentecostal affiliation based on 
socioeconomic variables. The socioeconomic variables included in the analysis were income, 
urban, education, and age. Income is measured by asking respondents their monthly income 
based on minimum wage.
18
 Urban is a dummy variable to indicate the location of the 
respondent’s resident where urban is coded as 1 and rural is coded as 0. Education is measure by 
the amount of years of education respondents have completed. And finally, age is reported as the 
respondent’s actual age.  
 The ANOVA analysis of socioeconomic variables on religious affiliation shows that the 
only significant coefficient is urban for the year of 2008 and age for the year of 2010. Up to 
2008, the likelihood of an individual identifying himself with Pentecostalism was greater if he 
lived in an urban area versus a rural area. In 2010, the relationship between urban versus rural 
area and identification to Pentecostalism becomes insignificant. Age is statistically insignificant 
for the year of 2008 and becomes significant in 2010. Although the coefficient shows 
significance at the .05 level, the difference in average age between Pentecostals and the rest of 
the population is only two years.  
All other variables were not statistically significant. Findings of the ANOVA analysis 
suggest then that there are no significant differences between Pentecostal Protestants and the rest 
of the population in terms socioeconomic status. It seems that the relationships that existed in 
2002 still remain.  
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 In 2010, minimum wage was equal to R$ 510.00 (approximately $280.00).  
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Table 1.1: Socioeconomic Background by Religious Affiliation (2010) 
  
 Pentecostal  Others   
 Mean/Std. 
Deviation 
n Mean/Std. 
Deviation 
n Significance 
Income 2.63 (1.58) 336 2.71 (1.71) 1964 .385 
Urban .88 (.322) 358 .86 (.322) 2059 .169 
Education 8.06 (3.72) 350 8.12 (3.96) 2025 .777 
Age 37.30 (15.0) 358 39.21 (15.76) 2025 .033 
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project (2010) 
 
Table 1.2: Socioeconomic Background by Religious Affiliation (2008) 
  
 Pentecostal  Others   
 Mean/Std. 
Deviation 
n Mean/Std. 
Deviation 
n Significance 
Income 3.55 (1.59) 167 3.82 (1.85) 1255 .077 
Urban 1.10 (.301) 170 1.20 (.400) 1314 .002 
Education 6.91 (4.02) 169 7.34 (4.372) 1299 .228 
Age 39.41 (15.75) 168 41.73 (17.13) 1308 .096 
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project (2008) 
 
 In order to illustrate better the comparison between Pentecostals and the rest of the 
population, figures 1.5 and 1.6 present data on income and education variations between the 
different religious groups. As Figure 1.5 shows, most Pentecostals (56.5 percent) earn a monthly 
income of up to twice the minimum wage. Most mainline Protestants (55.1 percent) also earn an 
income of up to twice the minimum wage. The data also show that Catholics remain very similar 
to mainline and Pentecostal Protestants in terms of income. As Figure 1.5 shows, most Catholics 
(57.9 percent) earn a monthly income of up to twice the minimum wage. Once again, the 
interesting finding here is the monthly income of the Spiritists. The income category that has the 
highest number (30 percent) of Spiritists represented is monthly income of “five to fifteen times” 
the minimum wage. Also, approximately 8 percent of Spiritists earn a monthly income of fifteen 
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times or more the minimum wage; this number is greater than the percentage on the same 
category for Catholics, mainline Protestants, Pentecostal Protestants, and no religion combined.
19
  
 In terms of education, Catholics, mainline Protestants, Pentecostals, and those with no 
affiliation to religion are very similar. For instance, the percentage of individuals that have some 
degree of high school experience is 40.5, 43.5, 46, 43.1 for Catholics, mainline Protestants,  
 
 
Figure 1.5: Distribution of Income by Religious Affiliation (LAPOP 2010) 
 
 
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project (2010) 
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 The percentage of Catholics, mainline Protestants, Pentecostal Protestants, and no religion that make fifteen or 
more times the minimum wage combined is 6.1. 
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Figure 1.6: Years of Education by Religious Affiliation (LAPOP 2010) 
 
 
Source: Latin American Public Opinion Project (2010) 
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8.6, 12.6, 71.1, and 10.4 for Catholics, mainline Protestants, Pentecostal Protestants, and no 
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educated between the three largest religious groups and those with no religious affiliation. 
Approximately 26 percent of Spiritists have had some degree of college experience. This 
percentage is double the percentage (12.6) of the second group (mainline Protestants) with the 
highest number of members that have had some college experience. 
In order to provide a further test on the socioeconomic identity of the Pentecostal Protestant, 
I also use a logit model to predict what variables have the greater likelihood of impacting 
Pentecostal affiliation. The results of the logit regression, presented on Table 1.3, show that 
income, urban, and education are not statistically significant variables predicting Pentecostal 
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small difference in age between Pentecostals and non-Pentecostals, where the former tends to be 
younger than the latter.  
 
Table 1.3: Socioeconomic Impact on Pentecostal Affiliation 
 
 Coefficient (Std. Err) 
Income  -.02   (.04) 
Urban .37    (.19) 
Education -.02   (.01) 
Age -.01   (.00)** 
Constant  -1.37 (.29) 
        *Significant at .05 level 
              ** Significant at .01 level  
              *** Significant at .001 level  
 
 All the previous analyses point to the following conclusion: based on socioeconomic 
variables, Pentecostal Protestants are not unique citizens. When one compares the socioeconomic 
background of the Pentecostal Protestant to that of the other main religious groups, the 
Pentecostal Protestant does not stand out. The Pentecostal Protestant is more likely to be 
economically disprivileged, have low levels of education, live in urban settings, and young. Such 
characteristics do not make Pentecostals Protestants unique. Catholics, mainline Protestants, 
adherents of Afro-religions, and those with no religious affiliation all seem to share the 
socioeconomic identity of the Pentecostal Protestant.  
 Although evidence points to the conclusion that individuals belonging to the main 
religious groups and those with no religious affiliation are similar, one religious group stands 
out: the Spiritists. Spiritists are significantly wealthier and more educated than the rest of the 
religious population. What makes the Spiritist unique? While it is beyond the scope of this 
chapter to investigate Spiritism, I, for the purpose of satisfying one’s curiosity, briefly discuss 
the possible reasons that make Spiritists a unique religious group. 
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Spiritists: The Outliers 
  
My explanation for the uniqueness of members belongimg to Spiritism comes from the 
nature of Spiritism itself. Unlike Catholicism and Protestantism, Spiritism gives individuals 
room to be spiritual but not religious. In some aspects, being religious and spiritual are 
synonyms. Both connote the belief in a supernatural power of some kind and also a desire to 
develop a relationship with that supernatural power. Also, both connote the desire to be part of 
rituals or practices that promote the connection between the individual and supernatural power. 
However, there are also important differences between these two terms. Religious studies scholar 
Robert Fuller, writes that modernism and cultural forces have reshaped how individuals see the 
“private” and “public” spheres of life (Fuller 2001). Many now associate faith with the private 
realm of life rather than the public realm of institutions and rituals. Therefore nowadays, the 
word spiritual is more likely associated to personal thought and experience while the word 
religious is more likely associated with membership in religious institutions, participation in 
formal rituals, and adherence to official doctrines (Fuller 2001). Basically, the “spiritual, but not 
religious” individual rejects the idea of a traditionally organized religion as a means for spiritual 
growth. Instead, these individuals have embraced an individualized spirituality where they are 
able to pick and choose from a set of different religious philosophies.  
Seeing Spiritists as spiritual but not religious perhaps explains their uniqueness. The 
freedom of thought and from traditional religion Spiritism offers its adherents matches the 
postmaterialistic attitude of the wealthy and more educated individual towards life. According to 
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Inglehart (1990), individuals that hold postmaterialistic values are less likely to be religious.
20
 
Also, postmaterialistic values are linked to higher levels of income. As Inglehart (1990) 
proposes, economic development may cause the shift away from materialistic to postmaterialistic 
values. Although the causal arrow cannot be drawn with precision, we can look at the uniqueness 
of Spiritists as originating from the higher levels of income and education these individuals have. 
In other words, from all the alternative religions, Spiritism offers the wealthier and more 
educated citizen the best option for their fulfillment of spiritual needs. As mentioned before, 
Spiritism teaches that there is a supernatural being, God; however, Spiritism does not require any 
practice or ritual from its adherents such as membership to an institution or a body of laws or 
doctrines.  For these reasons, the wealthier and more educated spiritual Brazilian may be 
attracted to Spiritism more than the other alternatives.  
In order to test the hypothesis that Spiritists are more likely to hold Postmaterialistic 
values than others belonging to the other major religious traditions, I build an index based on 
Inglehart’s postmaterialism index.21 The results of the ANOVA regression (see Table 1.4) show 
that the difference in mean score between Spiritists and others is statistically significant (.000 
level). Spiritists are more likely to hold Postmaterialistic values than members of the other major 
religious groups. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
20
 Also see Inglehart 1995, 1997 and 2005.  
21
 My index was based on the answer to the following two questions. First, do you approve or disapprove the right of 
homosexual union? Respondents indicated their approval by rating their response on a scale of 0-10 (where 0 is 
highly disapprove and 10 is highly approve). Second, do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I would 
approve of my daughter/son’s union to a black person. Respondents indicated how much they agreed to the 
statement by rating their response on a scale of 0-7 (where 0 is completely disagree and 7 is completely agree). 
These two questions try to capture the freedom of speech dimension related Inglehart’s postmaterialism index. The 
other dimension of postmaterialism regards the importance of say in political matters. Due to data constraints, and 
more specifically, the lack of appropriate questions, I do not measure the second dimension of postmaterialism.  
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Table 1.4: ANOVA Analysis  
 
Descriptives 
 
     95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
  
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Minimum Maximum 
Catholic 1411 12.9 3.72 .099 12.8 13.2 2.00 17.00 
Mainline 
Protestant 
302 12.2 3.92 .225 11.7 12.6 2.00 17.00 
Pentecostal 343 12.4 3.65 .197 11.9 12.7 2.00 17.00 
Spiritist  53 14.9 2.94 .405 14.05 15.7 7.00 17.00 
Total  2109 12.8 3.74 .082 12.6 12.9 2.00 17.00 
 
ANOVA 
 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups  
450.780 3 150.260 10.849 .000 
Within 
Groups 
29154.733 2105 13.850   
Total 29605.514 2108    
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The purpose of this chapter was to investigate the socioeconomic characteristics of the 
Pentecostal Protestant. As evidence shows, the individuals representing this religious group are 
not unique. As expected, the Pentecostal Protestant is poor, young, has between low and average 
levels of school education, and lives, mostly, in urban areas. These characteristics do not make 
the Pentecostal Protestant unique since these characteristics are also representative of Catholics, 
mainline Protestant, members of Afro-religions and those with no religious affiliation.  
 If the Pentecostal Protestant resembles the members of the other major religious groups 
and nonreligious in terms of socioeconomic background, does that similarity carry over to 
political behavior? How does Pentecostalism affect political behavior? These are the main 
questions I seek to answer in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
PENTECOSTALISM AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR  
 
How does Pentecostalism affect political behavior? Overall, the relationship between 
Christianity and politics is complex. The Christian doctrine carries the seeds for both, political 
quiescence and activism. While on one hand, it teaches that one should respect those in power 
and the authority they possess, on the other, it also encourages one to be a spokesperson for 
certain issues (behavior that may translate to political action). The main focus of this chapter is 
to understand how Pentecostalism affects the political behavior of citizens. Is the Pentecostal 
more engaged in politics than others? Or, is he quiescent towards the political system?  
 
RELIGIOSITY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 
 
The relationship between religiosity and political engagement is a complex one. While 
some scholars suggest that religiosity boosts political participation, others make the argument 
that it suppresses. The explanations linking the influence of religiosity to political behavior often 
revolve around the church, religious doctrine and affiliation, and the individual level of 
commitment aspects of religion.  
 Churches, specifically the Catholic and Protestant ones, have traditionally been important 
political and social actors in society. For instance, in the United States the church played a key 
role in many important historical junctures such as the civil war and Civil Rights movement 
(Calhoun-Brown 2000; Sweet 1912). In Europe, the church contributed to the end of 
communism (Ediger 2005; Mucha and Zaba 1992). In Latin America, the church was a strong 
opposing force to many of the authoritarian regimes imposed between 1950-70s (Fleet and Smith 
1997; Sabia 1997; Bruneau and Hewitt 1989; Bruneau 1985). Since Emperor Constantine’s 
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conversion and consequently use of religion as justification for political authority to today’s 
context, the church has been an institution that has exerted great influence in society. According 
to Campbell and Yonish (2003:89), “churches are by far the most prevalent form of voluntary 
associations.” Churches are important organizations in society because they provide a place for 
people to meet, opportunities for the development of leadership skills, information about public 
affairs, delivery of welfare services, opportunities for socialization across social and ethnic 
backgrounds, and encouragement for participation in other voluntary associations (Norris and 
Inglehart 2004). Due to the role of the church in society, church attendance and membership are 
two of the most popular religion variables in the literature. The argument is that the individual 
that attends or is a member of church is provided with the resources and opportunities to develop 
civic skills necessary to engage effectively in politics (Brown and Brown 2003; Brady et al. 
1995).   
 Another important religion variable relates to the religious doctrine or affiliation one 
associates. The argument is that different religious traditions result in different social 
perspectives, and consequently, different political behaviors (Brewer 2003; Wald and Calhoun-
Brown 2011; Patterson 2004). When individuals accept membership in a particular group or 
organization, in this case the church, the individual also accepts, to a certain degree, the norms 
and values of the group. Therefore, a member of the Protestant church that abides to the 
Protestantism may have a different worldview from an individual affiliated to a different religion 
or religious doctrine.    
Finally, explanations linking the influence of religiosity to political behavior also 
consider the level of commitment of the individual to his or her religion, measured often by the 
intensity of religious beliefs. Although one may be a member of a church and be exposed to the 
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doctrines of that organization, the level of commitment of the individual to the doctrine he is 
exposed is also important. In other words, how committed an individual is to his faith beliefs 
may have important implications for political behavior (Patterson 2005; 2004). In studying the 
relationship between religion and politics in Guatemala and Costa Rica, Steigenga (2001) finds 
that religious beliefs are a significant factor affecting political variables. In the Guatemalan and 
Costa Rican cases, higher scores on a scale of religious conservatism were positively related to 
political quiescence towards conflictual policies and willingness to vote. Religious conservative 
individuals were willing to participate in politics through voting but were unwilling to engage in 
potentially conflictual behavior that could challenge political authority. Steigenga’s scale of 
religious conservatism was based on differences in responses to questions regarding 
millennialism, doctrinal orthodoxy, and images of God among respondents. Higher scores on the 
scale of religious conservatism meant that the respondent tended to agree with statements like the 
following: “Christ will return soon,” “the Bible should be interpreted literally,” and “God judges 
wrong-doers.” In Steigenga’s analysis, among Catholics, mainline Protestants, Pentecostals, and 
non-religious, Pentecostals scored the highest in all indicators.  
Another study supplements the importance of the intensity of religious beliefs to political 
participation. McKenzie (2001) investigates the claim that church attendance has a positive 
effect in some types of political participation (i.e. voting) but a negative effect on others (i.e. 
nonelectoral activities). McKenzie argues that this differing effect is due to self-selection biases
22
 
and that once self-selection is considered, church attendance plays no role in a respondent’s 
participation in politics; in other words, church attendance is not the best measure to predict 
political behavior since “congregants’ decisions to attend church frequently or infrequently 
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 McKenzie measures self-selection as the respondents’ degree of fundamentalism based on their beliefs about the 
Bible.  
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partially reflect their underlying beliefs about fundamentalism. Present political behavior 
scholarship fails to account for the confounding influences of these types of personal motivations 
for church attendance.” (2001:486).  
The literature briefly presented here illustrates the multidimensionality of religiosity. 
What comparativists have seen is that different aspects of religiosity affect political participation 
differently (Patterson 2005;2004). Next I will describe how religion has been said to boost and 
suppress political participation.  
 
Religiosity as a Boost to Political Participation 
   
The argument that religion boosts political participation often deals more with the role of 
churches in communities than with religious doctrines and individual commitment aspects of 
religiosity. The church can influence political behavior in multiple ways. Churches provide 
individuals with the appropriate environment to learn and improve those civic skills necessary 
for political participation (Alex-Assensoh and Assensoh 2001; Putnam 2000; Verba et al. 1995; 
Peterson 1992; Morris 1984) – these skills are, but not limited to, writing letters, speaking in 
front of groups, taking part in meetings, and voting; they are the source of theological and moral 
perspectives that guide how individuals make decisions about public policy (Tetlock 2000; 
Calhoun-Brown 1996; Wald et al. 1993; Wald et al. 1988, 1990); they reinforce and facilitate the 
transmission of group norms through its frequent patterns of social interaction (i.e. worship 
services) (Wald et al. 1988); and finally, they serve as sites for direct mobilization (Fitgerald and 
Spohn 2005; Wielhouwer 2000; Harris 1999; Calhoun-Brown 1996).  
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As to religious doctrines, the link between religious teachings and political participation 
is a complex one. As mentioned before, individuals that subscribe to different religions, and 
consequently different religious doctrines, are exposed to different teachings. These different 
teachings may impact how individuals perceive the world. Therefore, the logic is that different 
religions may result in different political behavior (Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2011; Patterson 
2004; Brewer 2003).  One of the most popular works that demonstrates this argument is found in 
Max Weber’s (1992) The Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Weber (1992) argued 
that Protestantism provided a more favorable environment for capitalism, and ultimately 
democracy, than Catholicism. His argument was based on the different doctrines between these 
two religious institutions. To Weber, while Protestantism emphasizes individuality, 
egalitarianism, asceticism and an active spiritual life, Catholicism emphasizes passive obedience 
to authority, collective values, and fatalism. These differences made Protestantism fertile ground 
for capitalism.  
The level of commitment of the individual to religious beliefs can also boost political 
participation. In Latin America’s Neo-Reformation: Religion’s Influence on Contemporary 
Politics, Eric Patterson examines the hypothesis that Protestants are more likely than Catholics to 
hold democratic values. Patterson’s analysis points to the importance of commitment to the faith. 
Patterson says: 
 
The primary cleavage in political attitudes was not between Catholics and Protestants but 
between the devout and not devout. Analysis of regression results confirmed a pattern of 
political differences based on religious intensity, not religious affiliation. (2005:149) 
 
Looking at the Brazilian and Chilean cases, Patterson found that devout believers were 
more like to express confidence in the government, to perceive others as law-abiding citizens, 
and to stand up for their rights than not devout believers. Also, in both cases religious intensity 
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had a positive effect on satisfaction with democracy – where devout believers are more likely to 
be satisfied with democracy than not devout believers. 
Religiosity as a Suppressor of Political Participation  
 
 While the argument that religion boosts political participation often deals with the role of 
the church in communities, the argument that religion functions as a suppressor of political 
participation often deals with religious doctrines.  Most of these arguments are based on Karl 
Marx’s idea that religion acts as an opiate on mass political consciousness. In describing the 
influence of the Pentecostal movement on Chilean politics, Lalive D’Epinay argued that 
Pentecostals were not looking for social or economic change but they were passive and 
apolitical. Lalive D’Epinay says of Chilean Pentecostal movement: 
 
Pentecostalism teaches its initiates withdrawal and passivity in political matters, limited 
only by the commandment of submissive to authority. In its social forms, it appears as 
specialized (since it is purely religious) reincarnation of a moribund society, and as their 
heir of the past rather than the precursor of emerging society. The components create a 
force for order rather than an element of progress; a defender of the status quo rather than 
a promoter of change (1967, 145). 
 
To Lalive D’Epinay, Pentecostalism was a refuge to those poor migrants and others 
whose lives had been transformed by rapid socioeconomic forces. Pentecostalism served to 
remedy a sense of anomie many felt. The concept of anomie was first introduced by French 
sociologist Emile Durkheim in the late 1800s in his analysis of the transition from simple 
agrarian to highly complex urban societies
23
. Durkheim argued that the increasing division of 
labor in society created a sense of normlessness in which individuals become uncertain of what 
models of life they should follow. A state of anomie may imply feelings of social isolation, 
loneliness, frustration, and hopelessness. According to Lalive D’Epinay, Pentecostalism was 
                                                          
23
 See Emile Durkheim (1893), The Division of Labor in Society.  
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more than the remedy to anomie. Pentecostalism was also the key to adaption of poor migrants to 
the new urban world. This latter use of Pentecostalism is also the reason why Lalive D’Epinay 
saw the faith as encouraging passivity in political matters. According to the author, what 
Pentecostalism did for the poor was to “reconstitute the rural hierarchal patron-client order in an 
urban setting.” (Peterson and Vasquez 2008:162). The continuation of hierarchical patron-client 
relationships, being reflect in the relationship between believers and pastors, only reinforced the 
sense of withdrawal from worldly things – including politics. In this manner, Pentecostalism, as 
a religious doctrine, served as a suppressor of political participation in Chile.  
The role of the church in the community has also been hypothesized to function as a 
suppressor of political participation. This argument focus on the time commitment believers have 
to their congregations. The logic is that churches may require too much from their members’ 
time and energy, which in turn may take time away from engaging in political activities. 
Campbell (2004) investigates the claim that Protestant churches foster political participation and 
one of his conclusions is that membership in evangelical Protestant denominations has a negative 
effect on political participation. Campbell (2004) concludes that the “time members of 
evangelical Protestant denominations spend in their service to their church comes at the expense 
of participation in the wider community, contrary to the way mainline Protestant and Catholic 
churches foster civic activity among their members” (155). The argument that some 
denominations may require more from members than others is based on Innaccone 
(1992,1994,1995) and Finke and Stark (1992) idea that some churches tend to be stricter than 
others, therefore, requiring more from their members. On one hand, strict churches are less likely 
than less strict churches to face collective action problems. Strict churches often have a high cost 
of membership – regulations of sexual behavior and social conduct – which screens out free 
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riders. On the other, strict churches require significant investments of time and commitment into 
the activities of their congregation which may cause members to hold fewer memberships in 
outside groups or organizations. Another argument emphasizing the role of the church as a 
suppressor of political participation lies at the role of clergy, or more importantly, their message. 
Previous research has shown that being a member of a political church enhances engagement in 
political activities (McClerking and McDaniel 2005; Harris 1999; Calhoun-Brown 1996; Tate 
1993). A political church is one that “holds political awareness and activity as salient pieces of 
its identity” (McDaniel 2002).  In such a church, members may discuss political matters with one 
another regularly, hear announcements or discussion on political campaigns, and even hear 
politicians or candidates as guest speakers. Therefore, members of political churches are more 
likely to engage in political than members of non-political churches.  
 
PENTECOSTAL POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 
 
Steward-Gambino and Wilson (1997) argue that the view that Pentecostals are always 
and inherently apolitical, or they “render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s,” is a stereotype. The 
traditional view is often this: Pentecostals are only concerned with matters of private morality, 
participation in church-related activities, and intra-group identity/solidarity. However, Steward-
Gambino and Wilson point to evidence showing otherwise.  As evidence, the authors point to the 
growth of protestant political parties in the region; one example being that of El Salvador where 
the growing widespread distrust of politics among protestant believers led to the establishment of 
two evangelical-inspired political parties in the 1990s.  
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The important question is not whether the Pentecostal Protestant is apolitical or not; 
rather, it is how politically engaged Pentecostal Protestants are, especially as compared to the 
other major religious groups – such as Catholics in the case of Brazil. Previous research shows 
that historically, Protestants and Catholics have stood on opposite sides of politics (Valenzuela et 
al. 2007). Starting in the nineteenth century, Protestants tended to support anticlerical, or leftist, 
parties and candidates for these allowed them to establish their own churches and schools and to 
practice their religion freely. On the other hand, Catholics tended to support parties and 
candidates that are more centrist or rightist for those have been historically linked to the church. 
This historical background may lead us to believe we will find differences in the political 
behavior of Protestants and Catholics. As to differences in political behavior between Pentecostal 
Protestants and mainline Protestants, the literature is not clear. From this perspective, we can 
suggest the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: Protestants and Catholics display different patterns of political behavior  
 
Another matter concerning the differences in political behavior between Protestants and 
Catholics voters is the frequency in which they engage in political matters. As discussed earlier, 
most of the literature describing the positive link between religiosity and political participation 
focus on the role of the church in the community. Patterson (2005) looks specifically at the 
importance of the Catholic and Protestant churches in Brazil in building civil skills and suggests 
that the Protestant church provides more opportunities than the Catholic Church for the 
development of those skills that are essential to political participation and democracy. More 
specifically, the Protestant church provides a place where individuals learn organizational skills, 
improve their analytical skills through programs emphasizing individual interpretation of the 
Bible, and are encouraged to be involved in their communities (Martin 1990; Cleary and 
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Steward-Gambino 1997). Two indicators might help us understand why Patterson (2005) claims 
that the Protestant church provides more opportunities than the Catholic church for the 
development of civic skills ; one lies at the role of the church itself and the other at the behavior 
of the attendees. On a study examining the role of the Protestant churches in communities of Rio 
de Janeiro, Conrado (2006) finds that out of the 843 churches included in the analysis, 57 percent 
of them have some type of social work project in place. The social work projects varied from the 
distribution of food to workshops for adults. One the other indicator, according to data from the 
ESEB 2002 Protestants are the most devout amongst all other believers. Respondents were asked 
how often they attended religious services. The answers ranged from “at least once a week”, 
“once a week”, “once or twice a month”, “a few times a year”, and “rarely.”Approximately 82 
percent of Protestants said they attended church at least once a week; for the same category, the 
percentage for Catholics, Spiritists and Afro religion was 36, 49, and 50 percent respectively. 
According to these numbers, it is clear that the Protestant spends more time at church than the 
Catholic believer. Also, Landim (2001) shows that the greater the frequency of attendance to 
religious services, the greater the likelihood of contributing financially to a social project. 
Therefore, if the Protestant believer spends more time in church than the Catholic believer, and 
therefore, has more opportunities to learn civic skills and might be more willing to support a 
social cause, the following hypotheses are proposed:  
 
H2: Protestants are more likely to be engaged in politics than Catholics.  
H2.1: Protestants are more likely to be interested in politics than Catholics.  
 
Although the Protestant church may provide the basis for greater opportunities than the 
Catholic church for members to learn civic skills, is there a difference between mainline and 
Pentecostal Protestant churches in how they encourage civic participation? No research to date 
51 
 
has examined this question specifically. However, Conrado (2006) provides some statistics on 
social projects directed by Protestant churches that shed some light into this question. According 
to Conrado, out of the 218 organizations that promote some type of social work with focus on 
children and teenagers in Rio de Janeiro, 72 percent are affiliated to the mainline Protestant 
church while 22 percent are affiliated to the Pentecostal church. To the author, the discrepancy in 
levels of social involvement between the two church groups is due to the experience and legacy 
of mainline Protestantism in Brazil. Since mainline congregations were established earlier than 
Pentecostal ones, they have been working with communities for longer periods of time; 
therefore, have also been able to create and develop more institutions that promote community 
development. From this brief review, the following hypothesis is suggested:  
 
H3: Mainline Protestants are more likely to display higher levels of political 
participation than Pentecostal Protestants.  
 
Finally, as to how religiosity affects political behavior one should also ask whether 
religiosity have a different effect in the likelihood of unconventional political participation 
among Protestants and Catholics. Some scholars have shown that biblical literalism and religious 
participation have a strong impact on the likelihood of participating in protest (Sherkat 1998; 
Quinley 1974). Using data from the 1996 Religious Identity and Influence (RII) Survey, 
McVeigh and Sikkink (2001) show that there are four factors that increase the likelihood of 
Protestants participating in unconventional political activity: volunteering for church 
organizations, a perception that religious values are being threatened, a belief that individuals 
should not have a right to deviate from Christian moral standards, and a belief that humans are 
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inherently sinful. It seems then that Protestants will engage in unconventional political behavior 
only under special circumstances.  
Additionally, as Steigenga (2001) shows, Pentecostals appear to be less likely to 
challenge the status than other religious groups, including mainstream Protestants. According to 
the author, Pentecostals’ unwillingness to mount potential challenges to political authority is a 
consequence of millennialist beliefs coupled with literal interpretation of the bible.
24
 From this 
discussion, the following hypotheses are suggested:  
 
H4: The Protestant voter is less likely to engage in unconventional politics than 
the Catholic voter. 
H4.1: The Pentecostal Protestant voter is less likely to engage in unconventional 
politics than the mainline Protestant voter. 
 
THE BRAZILIAN PENTECOSTAL PROTESTANT: DATA AND MEASURES 
 
 In order to test the suggested hypotheses on the political behavior of Pentecostal 
Protestants, I use the Latin American Public Opinion Project, the Americas Barometer (LAPOP) 
(2010). This survey was administered between March and April of 2010 based on face-to-face 
interviews conducted in Portuguese. The total N of the project is 2,482 respondents.  
 In this next section, a series of political activities are analyzed in the light of religiosity. 
When political scientists talk about political participation, one of the most often analyzed 
variables is voting turnout. In the Brazilian case, voting turnout does not seem to be a good 
indicator of engagement in politics since voting is mandatory. Voting became mandatory in 1932 
in an effort to maximize the number of voters and therefore, voices represented through the 
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 Such as the passage on respecting and submitting to local authorities described in Romans 13:1-2 saying: “Let 
every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist 
have been instituted by God. 
2 
Therefore whoever resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those 
who resist will incur judgment.” 
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process. If an eligible voter
25
 does not cast his ballot on election day, he is at risk of losing his 
eligibility as a voter. In order to prevent a loss of voting rights, the individual must report to the 
Superior Electoral Court the reason why he did not vote. Also, individuals that fail to comply 
have to pay a fine of approximately $35. Because the incentives
26
 to vote are so high, voting is 
not an appropriate measure of voluntary engagement in political activities. Therefore, in the 
following section, other standard measures of political participation such as contacting a public 
official and working in a political campaign are analyzed. The key dependent and independent 
variables are the following:  
 
Dependent variables  
 
Contacting Elected Officials. This variable asks respondents the following question: In order to 
find a solution for your problems, or problems faced by the community, have you contacted the 
local authorities such as the mayor or governor? The variable was coded as 1 for “yes” and 0 for 
“no”.  
Community Work. This variable asks respondents whether they have contributed to the solution 
of a problem in their community in the last twelve months. The answers ranged from “once a 
week”, “once or twice a month”, “once or twice a year”, or “never.” I recoded this variable into a 
dummy variable where any answer indicating participation was coded as 1 and non-participation 
was coded as 0.
27
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 Voting is mandatory for all individuals between the ages of 18 – 70 years old. Voting is option for all individuals 
between the ages of 16 and 18, for those older than 70, and to the illiterate.  
26
 Also, the revoked ability to vote, or the loss of voting eligibility, may have further consequences. A citizen that 
loses his voting rights may also not be able to apply for a passport; apply for loans through public banks; receive his 
month salary (if he works for any governmental institution); and, take any exam for governmental job position.  
27
 The answers “once a week”, “once or twice a month”, and “once or twice a year” or coded as 1; “never” was 
coded as 0. 
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 Political Work. This variable asks respondents whether they worked for a political party or 
candidate during the presidential elections of 2006. The variable was coded as 1 for “yes, I 
worked” and 0 for “I didn’t work.”  
Political Persuasion. This variable asks respondents the following question: during political 
campaigns, some people try to convince others to vote for a specific candidate or political party. 
How often have you tried to convince other people to vote for a candidate or a political party? 
The available answers were “frequently”, “sometimes”, “rarely”, and “never.”  
Interest in Politics. This variable asks respondents how interested they are in politics. The 
answers range from “very much interested”, “somewhat interested”, “little interest”, “no 
interest.”  
Protest. This variable asks the following question: in the last twelve months, have you 
participated in a public protest? “Yes” was coded as 1 and “no” was coded as 0.  
 
Independent variables  
 
Religious Affiliation. Since the goal of this chapter is to investigate whether religiosity has an 
independent impact on political activities, a dummy variable is included to indicate each of the 
three main religious groups: mainline Protestants, Pentecostal Protestants, Spiritists. A dummy 
variable to indicate nonreligious is also added to the models. This variable is based on the 
following survey question: what is your religion, if you have one? Respondents had the 
following options: “Catholic”, “traditional Protestant”, “non-Christian”, “no religion, but 
spiritual”, “Pentecostal Protestant,” “Mormon”, “native religions (candomble, umbanda, etc.)”, 
“Spiritist”, “Jewish”, “Atheist”, and “Jehovah Witness.”   
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Devout. As Patteron (2004, 2005) and Steigenga (2001) have shown, religious intensity, 
measured in terms of how devout one is to his or her faith, matters. This variable asks 
respondents the following question: how important is religion in your life? The answers were 
coded as the following: “very important”, “somewhat important”, “not very important”, and “not 
important.”  
 
Control Variables  
 
The standard control variables were included:  
Income. This variable is a measure of the income of the household. This variable was coded on a 
scale from 0 to 10 where (0) was “no income”; (1) 0-R$510.00; (2) R$510.01-1,020.00; (3) 
R$1,020.01-1,530.00; (4) R$1,530.01-2,550.00; (5) R$ 2,550.01-3,570.00; (6) R$ 3,570.01 – 
4,080.00; (7) R$ 4,080.01- 6,120.00; (8) R$ 6,120.01-7,650.00; (9) R$ 7,650,01-R$10.200,00; 
(10) more than R$10,200.00.  
Age. This variable represents the age of the respondent 
Education. This variable captures the respondents’ total years of education.  
Gender. Males were coded as 1 and females as 0.  
Urban. This is a dummy variable where 1 indicates that the respondent lived in an urban area and 
0 indicates the respondent lived in a rural area.  
 
Important Methodological Note  
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 Since Catholics comprise the majority of the population, Catholics will be use here and in 
chapter 4 as the out-group. Or the Catholics will be the reference group to the other religious 
affiliation dummies. Also, those religious groups not examined here, Mormon, native traditions, 
Jewish, and Jehovah Witnesses, were excluded from the dataset.  
Results  
 
 The impact of religiosity on several different types of political activities is summarized 
on Table 2.1 and Table 2.2. Overall, the effect of religiosity on the prospects of engaging in 
political activities is weak. Religiosity is only statistically significant on three of the six different 
measures of political activities examined. Religiosity, or religious affiliation, has a significant 
effect on political work, community work, and political persuasion. Generally speaking, the 
mainline Protestant voter seems to be more politically active than Pentecostals and Catholic 
voters. According to the logit and regression analyses, being a mainline Protestant increases the 
likelihood of political participation in three different aspects.  The three are: working for a 
political candidate or a political party during a campaign, engaging in activities to help the 
community to address pressing problems, and engaging in conversations aiming to persuade 
others regarding political matters. Being a Catholic is not statistically significant in any of the 
measures of political activity; therefore, unveiling Catholics as the least engaged in politics. 
Being Pentecostal Protestant is only statistically correlated to political work, or working for a 
political candidate or a political party during a campaign. A closer look at the data show clearer 
differences between the three religious groups examined here.   
 As to political work, Pentecostal Protestants have the highest percentage of individuals 
saying they have worked either for a candidate or political party during a campaign. Catholics 
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are the least involved in this type of activity. While approximately 12 percent of Catholics have 
worked for a candidate or a political party during a campaign, the percentages for Pentecostal 
Protestants and mainline Protestants are 18.2 and 16.4 respectively.  
 As to community work, mainline Protestants have the highest level of participation in 
helping their communities to address pressing needs. Catholics have the lowest percentage on 
this measure, slightly behind Pentecostal Protestants. While 32.3 percent of mainline Protestants 
have done something to help the improvement of their communities, the percentages for 
Pentecostal Protestants and Catholics are 26.8 and 25 respectively.  
 As to political persuasion, once again, mainline Protestants are the most active in this 
category. Mainline Protestants are more likely to engage in conversations with the aim of 
influencing others in political matters than Pentecostal Protestants and Catholics. While 
approximately 33 percent of mainline Protestants said they practice political persuasion 
“frequently” or “sometimes”, the percentages for Pentecostal Protestants and Catholics are 28 
and 21.4 respectively.  
 The findings regarding not only the relationship between religiosity and political 
activities but also, most importantly, the differences in engagement in various political activities 
confirm the expectation presented in the beginning of this chapter. Overall, Protestants were 
expected to be more politically engaged than Catholics. The logit and multiple regression 
analyses confirm those expectations. Additionally, regarding differences between the mainline 
and Pentecostal Protestant, mainline Protestants are more politically active than Pentecostal 
Protestants.   
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Table 2.1: Predictors of Political Activities
28
 
 
 Political Work 
 
Contacting 
Officials 
Community Work  Protest 
Pentecostal 
Protestant 
.359 (.19)* -.466 (.32) .076 (.15) -.196 (.29) 
Mainline 
Protestant  
.225 (.20) .157 (.27) .255 (15) -.199 (.29) 
Spiritist -1.68 (1.01) -1.20 (1.02) .200 (.34) -.640 (.74) 
Nonreligious -.032 (.32) .284 (.43) .121 (.25) .033 (.43) 
Church 
Attendance  
.028 (.06) .134 (.09) .138 (.04) ** .075 (.08) 
Devoutness .185 (.11) .106 (.16) .080 (.08) .023 (.15) 
Income -.100 (.05)* .069 (.05) .109 (.03)** .063 (.05) 
Education -.020 (.02) .029 (.03) .057 (.01) *** .122 (.030)*** 
Age -.013 (.005)** .006 (.006) .020 (.003)*** -.002 (.007) 
Urban  .886 (.24)*** .315 (.32) -.596 (.14) *** .361 (.34) 
Constant  -2.02 (.47)*** -4.63 (.73)*** -2.93 (.37)*** -4.62(.70)*** 
R
2
 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 
N 2068 2206 2187 2202 
Source:LAPOP (2010) 
* significance at .05 level; ** significance at .01 level; *** significance at .001 level.  
 
 As Table 2.5 will show the differences in responses to the question “how important is 
religion in your life.” Pentecostal Protestants show the highest degree of devoutness while 
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 These models were estimated using logit analysis.  
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Catholics show the least. Whereas 89.2 percent of Pentecostal Protestants say religion is very 
important in their lives, the percentages for mainline Protestants and Catholics are 85.3 and 67.9 
respectively. Although there are significant differences between Protestants and Catholics in how 
devout there are to their faith, devoutness is not, unexpectedly, statistically correlated to any of 
the measures of political activities. Although these findings regarding devoutness can be seen as 
contrary to what Patterson (2004,2005) and Steigenga (2001) have found, we should be careful 
to draw conclusions since both authors do not analyze the link of devoutness per se to strictly 
political activities. Instead, Patterson and Steigenga’s argument is that religious intensity, or 
devoutness, matters to political attitudes and church related events respectively.  
 Although devoutness is not a predictor of political activities, church attendance is 
statistically significant in predicting community work and interest in politics. The coefficients 
show that the more one attends religious services, the more likely he is to engage in community 
work and to be interested in politics.  
As expected, socioeconomic measures are strong indicators of some political activities. Income is 
a statistically significant indicator of political work, community work, and interest in politics. As 
to political work, higher income increases the likelihood of working for a candidate or political 
party during a campaign. As to community work, higher income increases the likelihood of one 
helping his community with a solution for a pressing need. And as to interest in politics, higher 
income decreases the likelihood of one not being interested in politics. Education is a statistically 
significant indictor of community work, protest, and interest in politics. Higher levels of 
education increase the likelihood of engaging in community projects, protest activities, and being 
interested in politics. It is not surprising that those with higher socioeconomic levels engage 
more in political activities than those with lower socioeconomic levels. This link between 
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socioeconomic status and political participation – that is, the more educated and wealthier 
individuals tend to me more engaged in politics than those that are less educated and with lower 
income –  has been found by several authors like Verba and Nie (1972), Milbrath and Goel 
(1977), Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), and Verba, Brady, and Scholzman (1995). 
 
Table 2.2: Predictors of Interest in Politics and Political Persuasion
29
 
 
 Interest in Politics Political Persuasion  
Pentecostal 
Protestant 
-.162 (.06)** .169 (.06)** 
Mainline 
Protestant  
-.057 (.06) .213 (.06)*** 
Spiritists -.231 (.13) .123 (.14) 
Nonreligious  .007 (.08) -.051 (.09) 
Church 
Attendance 
.047 (.02)** .027 (.02) 
Devoutness -.015 (.03) -.013 (.03) 
Income .054 (.01)*** .016 (.01) 
Education .029 (.005)*** .008 (.006) 
Age -.0007 (.001) -.003 (.001) 
Urban  -.229 (.05)*** -.303 (.06)*** 
Constant  1.75 (.13)*** 1.77 (.14)*** 
R
2
 0.04 0.02 
N 2196 2178 
          Source:LAPOP (2010) 
         * significance at .05 level; ** significance at .01 level; *** significance at .001 level. 
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Table 2.3: Political Persuasion by Religious Affiliation
30
 
 
 Frequently  Sometimes  Rarely   Never 
Catholic  5.4% 16.0% 17.6% 60.9% 
Mainline 
Protestant 
7.5% 25.6% 15.2% 51.6% 
Pentecostal 
Protestant  
6.44% 21.6% 18.5% 53.5% 
Spiritist 5.45% 18.2% 21.8% 54.5% 
Nonreligious 3.9% 15.7% 17% 63.4% 
Source: LAPOP (2010) 
 
Table 2.4: Political Activity by Religious Affiliation 
 
 Political Work Community Work  
 Yes No Yes No 
Catholic  11.6% 88.4% 25% 75% 
Mainline 
Protestant 
16.4% 83.6% 32.3% 67.8% 
Pentecostal 
Protestant  
18.2% 81.8% 26.8% 73.2% 
Spiritist 1.9% 98.1% 32.1% 67.9% 
Nonreligious 9.6% 90.6% 20% 80% 
Source: LAPOP (2010) 
 
Age is a statistically significant predictor of political work and community work. The 
older one is, the more likely he is to work for a candidate or a political party during a campaign 
and to engage in community projects. Urban is a statistically significant predictor of five out of 
the six political activities. While living at an urban setting increases the likelihood of one 
working for a political candidate or political party, contacting officials about public issues, 
engaging in community work, being interested in politics, and engaging in political persuasion, it 
does not affect the likelihood of being part of a public protest. Findings on the relationship 
between the urban/rural divide and political participation are somewhat ambiguous. Although 
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 Based on the question: how often do you engage in political persuasion?  
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most would agree that living in urban areas produces the overall highest levels of political 
participation, others point to the evidence depicting citizens from rural areas as more politically 
active than citizens from urban ones. The argument for higher levels of political participation in 
urban settings comes from the view that there is more psychological involvement or stimuli to 
participate in politics in urban versus rural areas. In urban settings, the citizen is expected to be 
more exposed to mass media and different types of cultures and perspectives; as a consequence, 
these experiences function as a boost to political involvement. However, some authors have 
point out to evidence supporting a different view. Urban areas can display lower levels of 
political participation than rural areas due to (1) the existence of a culture of political alienation 
that might emerge in urban settings and (2) the reinforcement of patron-client relationships 
through voting patterns in rural settings.
31
 
Table 2.5: Devoutness by Religious Affiliation 
 
 Very important  Somewhat 
important  
Of little 
importance 
Not important 
Catholic  67.9% 24.3% 6.0% 1.8% 
Mainline 
Protestant 
85.3% 11.5% 2.6% 0.6% 
Pentecostal 
Protestant  
89.2% 8.0% 2.3% 0.6% 
Spiritist 65.4% 26.9% 5.8% 1.9% 
Source: LAPOP (2010) 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The goal was this chapter was to analyze the effects of Pentecostalism on patterns of 
political participation. The results of the various models point to the conclusion that not only 
Pentecostalism, but also the other set of religious beliefs have little influence on political 
participation. Although mainline Protestantism was positively correlated to the most number of 
political activities (3 out of 6), the P-value for all those relationships was never smaller than 
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 For country studies analyzing the gap between urban-rural, see Wickham (2002) and Fahmy (2002) on Egypt; 
Albritton and Thawilwadee (2002)  and Laothamatas (1996) on Thailand.   
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0.01. Pentecostalism was only positively correlated to one type of political activity – political 
work – but like mainline Protestantism, its P-value was significant at the .05 level. Catholicism 
was not correlated to any of the political activity measures. These findings confirm the overall 
expectation of this chapter – that Protestants are more politically engaged than Catholics. 
Protestants, mainline and Pentecostals, are more likely to engage in political persuasion, 
community work, and work for a political party or candidate than Catholics. Catholics were the 
least engaged in politics. Socioeconomic variables were the strongest predictors of political 
activity. Higher levels of income, more years of education, and living in urban settings all 
significantly increase the likelihood of political participation. As Brady et al. (1995) show, 
socioeconomic variables are powerful predictors of political participation because variables such 
as income and education can have a direct link to political activities. For instance, money enables 
people to donate money to specific candidates or political organizations. Higher levels of 
education also mean a greater likelihood of having better vocabulary skills and more 
opportunities to practice civil skills.  
In the analysis of the socioeconomic background of religious affiliation in chapter 2, 
Spiritists turned out to be the most unique religious group. Spiritists were significantly more 
educated and wealthier than Protestants and Catholics. Therefore one could expect Spiritists to  
also show higher levels of political participation. However, according to the data used here, 
Spiritists did not show a unique pattern of political participation. Spiritism was not significantly 
correlated to any of the measures of political participation.  
 The analysis of this chapter points to the conclusion that religion is not a strong predictor 
of political engagement. However, does the same pattern hold when one analyzes levels of 
support for democracy? This will be the main topic of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
PENTECOSTALISM AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY  
 
What are the determinants of democratic support? Attempts to answer this question have been 
popular amongst comparativists since the third wave of democracy washed the shores of many 
countries around the globe starting in the late 1970s. While the explanations for the causes of 
the phenomena are varied, ranging from cultural to systemic ones, one school of thought has 
focused on the impact of values on democracy. The central goal of this chapter is to examine the 
effects of religion, as a variable pertaining to individuals’ value systems, on support for 
democracy; more specifically, to understand whether Pentecostalism has impacted citizens’ 
support for democratic institutions in a unique way.  
 
THE DETERMINANTS OF DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL CULTURE   
 Starting in the 1980s, some key authors have focused on the role of a country’s political 
culture to explain the emergence, persistence, and lack of democracy (Huntington 1984; Almond 
and Verba 1989; Inglehart 1990, 1997; Diamond 1993; Lipset 1994). One of the seminal essays 
within this literature is Almond and Verba’s (1989) Civic Culture where the authors explain 
patterns of political behavior based on the political culture of the country. The term political 
culture referred to political orientations toward the political system and the role of self in that 
system. One of the main arguments set forth by the authors was that the viability of democratic 
institutions is strongly influenced by the political culture predominant amongst the population. In 
other words, a political culture marked by high levels of political efficacy, trust and support for 
the political system is more likely to be congruent with a democratic rather than other types of 
political structures. Since Almond and Verba’s piece, political culture explanations have become 
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popular in the field. Later, Putnam’s Making Democracy Work, adds to the political culture 
approach by suggesting that social capital, a more structuralist perspective, is a key ingredient of 
effective institutional performance. Putnam defined social capital as “features of social 
organization such as networks, norms, and social trust that facilitate coordination and 
cooperation for mutual benefit” (1993:167). In his analysis of Italian regions, Putnam found that 
the northern political institutions were more effective than the southern institutions due to sharp 
contrasts in rates of endowed social capital between the two regions. Northern political intuitions 
were more effective in building trust and connections amongst its citizens than the northern 
institutions due to the higher number of sports clubs and cultural associations that promoted 
social cooperation. Other works such as Inglehart and Flanagan (1987), Inglehart (1990), and 
Inglehart and Norris (2005) have found support for the link between orientations and values and 
regime type. 
These previous works suggest that there is strong link between political culture and the 
political structure of a country where not only values and orientations (as emphasized by Almond 
and Verba) but also patterns of behavior (emphasized by Putnam) are important factors in 
determining what type of political institutions countries adopt. 
  Although the political culture approach has received a lot of praise from some, it has not 
gone unchallenged
32
. One of the common challenges, and perhaps more serious one, comes from 
studies emphasizing the importance of institutions to political outcomes. Muller and Seligson 
(1994) challenge the assumption that individuals’ beliefs have a causal effect on regime type. In 
contrast, they make the argument that civic culture, or at least some of its indicators, can be an 
effect rather than a cause of democracy. The authors believe that attitudes such as political trust, 
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 Other challenges can be found on the basis of the experience of post-communist countries, the effect of education, 
life cycles, and methodological problems (Dutch and Taylor 1993; Lane 1992). 
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support for the system, and political competence are learned through the experience of living in a 
stable democratic regime. Although the data used by the authors do not completely discredit the 
basic premises of the link between political culture and democracy, evidence showed that 
interpersonal trust – one of the measures of civic culture – is an effect rather than a cause of 
democracy.
33
 Another similar challenge comes from Rohrschneider’s (1999) analysis of 
ideological values in unified Germany. Looking at the political elites of East and West Germany, 
Rochrschneider found that eastern German political values reflected their exposure to a socialist 
regime whereas western German values reflected their exposure to democratic institutions. 
According to Rochrschneider, the difference in acquisition of democratic values between eastern 
and western political elites stems from the different institutional designs politicians were 
socialized into. While eastern German elites were socialized into a political structure where 
openness and freedom to criticize the government were subject to punishment, western German 
elites were socialized into a system where political participation and competition were 
encouraged. The central argument then is that learning democratic values requires individuals to 
be exposed to those institutions that provide opportunities for the development of democratic 
citizenship-qualities. If a country’s political framework does not provide citizens the 
opportunities to learn and practice democratic citizenship-qualities, mass support for democratic 
ideals may be weak. In the case of unified Germany, the politicians’ ideologies reflected the 
ideological premises of the political systems to which they were exposed. Therefore, 
Rochrschneider asserts that “democratic values presumably follow, but do not have to precede, 
the establishment of democratic institutions which function well because – once established – 
they shape mass and elite ideological values” (1999:9). 
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 The strongest indicator on the determinants of democratization in the authors’ analysis was not an attitude of the 
general public but a macroeconomic variable – income inequality. 
67 
 
 Even in the face of these challenges, the political culture approach has been very much 
useful to understand the sustainability or quality of democracy. As mentioned before, since 
Almond and Verba’s introduction of the concept of political culture, many other authors have 
examined and shown empirical evidence supporting the view that values and orientations do 
have an impact on democracy.
34
 One of the most recent and throughout examples can be found 
on Inglehart and Welzel’s (2005) Modernization, Cultural Change and Democracy. In this piece, 
the authors analyze the consequences brought by modernization and its political implications. 
The central argument is that modernization, or economic development, causes a shift in 
individual values which in turn has political consequences. This shift in values represents a move 
away from values emphasizing physical and economic security towards those emphasizing self-
expression. Once individuals’ values start reflecting the latter, they will also demand those 
intuitions that will best suit their newly acquired preference for civil and political liberties – in 
this case, democracy. The argument is best summarized by the authors’ words:  
 
Economic development leads to growing emphasis on self-expression values—a 
syndrome of trust, tolerance, political activism, support for gender equality, and emphasis 
on freedom of expression, all of which are conducive to democracy. This implies that 
rising emphasis on self-expression values should be closely correlated with economic 
development as well as civil society, citizen participation and democracy. (2003:557) 
 
What Inglehart and Welzel’s research communicates is that democracy is not a “machine 
that, once set up, functions by itself” but that democracy relies on deep-rooted orientations 
among citizens (2005:2).  
From this previous discussion, one thing is clear: values matter. And they matter much. 
However the idea of values is very much abstract. After all, what type of values matter most? 
Obviously, the answer to this question is “it depends.” To some people, some sets of values will 
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 For more see: Lee (2008) on Asia ; Inglehart (2003) and Tessler (2002) on Arabic countries; Gibson et al. (1992) 
on post-communist countries.  
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exercise more influence in their political orientations, and consequently political behavior, than 
others. There are innumerous factors that influence the formation of our values; and religion is 
just one of those possible factors. Religion becomes an important variable to political scientists 
when it becomes the foundation for political orientations. For the religious individual, religion, 
overtly or covertly, influences political behavior by enforcing some attitudes while discouraging 
others (Guth et al. 1997; Green 2003).  
For a while, religion was a missing or forgotten variable in political science. Many 
thought religion would disappear due to the rising levels of secularization observed in different 
societies around the globe; however, as Chavez (1994) puts it “religion’s stubborn refusal to 
disappear has prompted major reevaluation of inherited models of secularization” (749). An 
empirical test to Chavez’s words can be found on Inglehart and Norris’ Sacred and Secular 
where the authors use evidence from the World Values Surveys and European Values Survey, 
including 191 countries worldwide, to show how secularization has impacted politics and social 
patterns in the world. One of the findings in their research is that “religious legacies leave a 
distinct and lasting imprint on contemporary values” (134); or in other words, religion still 
influences patterns of political behavior that varies across countries and individuals.
35
 Because of 
this important role of religion in shaping our values, this section focuses on determining how 
religion affects individuals’ perspectives on democracy.  
 
RELIGION AND SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY  
 
                                                          
35
 The evidence presented by the authors point to a decline in religiosity and the role of religion in politics only in 
industrial and postindustrial countries. And even in these countries, the pace of change differs from one country to 
another.  
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When it comes to the link between religion and democracy, it has been widely seen that 
there is no simple causal relationship between the two. Historically, religious beliefs and liberal-
democratic politics have been seen as incompatible. This incompatibility rests on the idea that to 
express one’s religious beliefs is to be intolerant of other individual different religious ideas. 
Therefore, many scholars have argued that religion and politics are at odds since religion is about 
absolutes and liberal-democratic politics is about tolerance and compromise. Also, another 
source of complexity comes from the idea that that some religious principles are better for 
democracy than others. As mentioned on the previous chapter, the multidimensionality of 
religion allows for differing effects on political behavior; the same is also expected for political 
attitudes and orientations. In an analysis of the link between religious beliefs and civic attitudes 
in the United States, Putnam and Campbell (2010) say this: 
 
Religious Americans are, in fact, more generous neighbors and more conscientious 
citizens than their secular counterparts. On the other hand, they are also less tolerant of 
dissent than secular Americans, an important civic deficiency. (358) 
 
What are those beliefs or practices that are good and bad for democracy? According to Griffith et 
al. (1956) some of these beliefs are love for and belief in freedom, active and constructive 
participation in the community life, integrity in discussion, and cooperation. These beliefs and 
practices may help religious individuals to give meaning to concepts closely linked to democratic 
practices such as fairness and justice.  
On the other hand, many scholars have shown that higher levels of religiosity are 
positively linked to political intolerance, especially for religious beliefs associated with 
fundamentalism (Beatty and Walter 1984; Wilcox and Jellen 1990; Ellison and Gay 1993; 
Eisenstein 2004). Much emphasis has been given to political tolerance in explaining democratic 
support. Political tolerance is important for democracy for enables people to respect others’ 
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political preferences, even when they may disagree with such preferences. Gibson (1998:37) says 
of the importance of political tolerance to democracy: “one of the most vexing problems of 
attempted democratic transformations is the problem of political intolerance – the unwillingness 
of citizens and leaders to allow all political interests to compete openly for political power… for 
bitter enemies to learn how to compete peacefully and democratically for political power is one 
of the most formidable problems for the consolidation of democratic transformation.” Without 
political tolerance, political competition cannot exist. Without political competition, the various 
political preferences of citizens cannot be represented in the political realm. If different 
perspectives are not allowed to be represented in the political realm, democratic ideals become 
undermined. Therefore, political tolerance is a key democratic value. 
Regarding this link, between political intolerance and religiosity, Stouffler (1995) is one 
of the first and most interesting studies to date due to its depth and creativity. Stouffer conduct a 
survey where he examined the reactions of respondents to danger of a communist conspiracy and 
its implications to civil liberties. Although the survey focused mainly on attitudes toward 
communism, Stouffer also asked respondents whether they would support certain forms of 
freedoms – such as allowing certain individuals to teach at a college or give a speech to the 
members of their community –  for unpopular groups such as atheists and homosexuals. The 
results of his research showed that only 28 percent of individuals that attended church in the 
month before the survey fell in the “more tolerant” category. In contrast, 36 percent of 
individuals that indicated they were not church goers fell into the same category. Overall, church 
goers were less tolerant of “unpopular” groups than those that did not attend a church.36 Many 
other scholars have found this same relationship between religion and tolerance where more 
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 One important finding in Stouffer’s work is that church denomination and religious affiliation matters. According 
to Stouffer’s data, southern Protestant (Baptist specially) were more intolerant than the northern Protestant and 
Catholics in general. Jews were more tolerant than Protestants and Catholics.  
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religious individuals also tend to be less tolerant than less religious and irreligious individuals 
(Steensland et al. 2000; Kellstedt and Green 1993; Layman and Green 1998; Williams Jr. et al. 
1976). When religious beliefs become associated with fundamentalism, the tendency for political 
intolerance becomes even higher. Religious fundamentalists emphasize a strict literal 
interpretation of their holy text, dispensational theology, and premillenial eschatology which 
make them even more prone to be intolerant of other views that do not match their own.  
 From the previous discussion, one thing seems clear: the relationship between religiosity 
and support for democracy is not a simple one. As pointed out by Putnam and Campbell (2010) 
and many others, while some aspects of religion are good for democracy, others aren’t. Bloom 
and Arikan (2012) refer to religion as a two-edged sword for its differential effect on attitudes 
toward democracy. The authors say:  
 
religious beliefs due to its association with conservative traditional values, engenders 
opposition to change, desire for order, and intolerance, which are incompatible with 
democratic norms and values. On the other hand, religiosity is also a social phenomenon. 
Involvement in social religious networks has a positive influence on civic skills, leading 
individuals to actively engage in politics and hold more positive attitudes towards 
democracy. (250) 
 
The words of Bloom and Arikan (2012) illustrate the complexity of untangling the effects of 
religiosity on democracy. Therefore, in order to produce better research findings, comparativists 
should keep in mind the multidimensionality of religiosity since many have shown that different 
aspects of religion impact political behavior and attitudes differently.  
 
 
EXPECTATIONS FROM PENTECOSTALISM  
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 How does Pentecostalism affect attitudes toward democracy? Will this expectation 
conform to the negative previous pattern between religion and democratic ideals? In nutshell, I 
expect religion to be, overall, positively correlated to democracy. Although religious beliefs are 
often negatively correlated to democratic ideals, I expect the other religious variables to have a 
positive impact on attitudes toward democracy. What follows is my argument for the suggested 
overall expectation.   
The wave of Pentecostalism in Brazil is marked by a lack of theological line. In other 
words, they do not emphasize, like the historic denominations, many of the doctrines of 
Christianity such as justification by faith, predestination, harmatology (the doctrine of sin), and 
eschatology.
37
 The Pentecostal churches, instead, tends to teach theological currents and 
doctrinal positions that fit the often strong charismatic profile of its leaders and the needs of the 
larger group. Therefore, we see churches adopting different main ministries; some churches 
focus more on the healing ministry, while others on the prosperity gospel; some focus on the 
ministry of redemption from curses, others on miracles; and the list goes on.  
In the past few of decades, Brazil has experienced the amazing growth of neo-Pentecostal 
churches. These churches differ from the traditional Pentecostal ones by their even greater lack 
of theological training and systematic knowledge of the bible, their emphasis on miracles, and 
the collecting of money from believers (Martin 2002, 1990; Oro 2001; Oro and Samen 2000).
38
 
Among these churches are the Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus (IURD), Renascer pra Cristo, 
Igreja Internacional da Graca de Deus, and Igreja Mundial do Poder de Deus. For neo-
Pentecostals, Christians should be a prosperous people. Christians should be wealthy, healthy, 
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 The branch of theology that deals with studies emphasizing the end times. 
38
 By emphasis on miracles I refer to special worship meetings or services where the sole goal is to “perform” 
miracles. In these special services, called culto do milagre, leaders and believers will spend most of the time praying 
waiting for a supernatural sign in answer to their need – often it deals with physical healing or financial provision.  
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and free of problems. A lack of those achievements (money, cars, nice houses, a good health 
state, and etc.) can be seen as a lack of faith, the presence of sin in one’s life, or as the result of 
the works of the devil (Oro 1997). The neopentecostal message seems more based on the 
doctrines that match the needs of the group than on the systematic theology generally 
emphasized by mainline, and even some Pentecostal, churches.    
The lack of systematic theology seen in the Pentecostal churches in general, perhaps, 
makes Pentecostals believers more tolerant of other views than mainline Protestants. As many 
have shown, often political intolerance and high levels of religiosity are negatively correlated. I 
expect Pentecostals to be more tolerant of diverging views than mainline Protestants because a 
lack of more in-depth knowledge about the doctrines of the bible avoids the formation of strong 
dispositions towards particular views; therefore, making Pentecostals more flexible to respecting 
ideas that  might not match their own.
39
 Here, I am making the argument that Glock and Stark 
(1996), Ellison and Musick (1993) and Wilcox and Jelen (1990) made before: that high levels of 
theological conservatism and doctrinal orthodoxy and negatively correlated to political tolerance.  
While a mainline Protestant church tends to cover multiple topics of the bible throughout 
the year, many Pentecostal (and specially Neopentecostal) churches will have weeks or months 
dedicated to one specific issue. The biggest Brazilian Neopentecostal church, the IURD, is well-
known for such campanhas, or campaigns. The latest campaign of the IURD was directed 
towards receiving the Holy Spirit.
40
The promise of the campanha was to receive the Holy Spirit 
in 7 days.  
This different pattern of preaching between mainline and Pentecostal Protestant churches 
may cause Pentecostals to hear less on dividing topics than mainline Protestants. A good 
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 Here, I am assuming that Pentecostals and mainline Protestants display a similar pattern on all other religiosity 
indicators.  
40
 The campaign kickoff started in February, 2012.  
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example is that of same-sex marriage.  The same-sex marriage issue is a fairly new discussed 
topic in many churches (Pentecostals and mainline) in Brazil. It was not until same-sex marriage 
became a political issue that religious leaders started to be more vocal about the churches’ stand 
on topic (not that it wasn’t a clear one already). Once the question “should same-sex marriage be 
legalized” hit national media, religious leaders started to use the pulpit as a means to remind 
believers what the bible says on the topic. Although the topic (as a political one) is a fairly new 
one in the church, mainline Protestants are more likely to have stronger predispositions on the 
topic than Pentecostal Protestants because they hear more about “marriage” in church. This 
flexibility of the structure of Brazilian Pentecostalism may allow for greater opportunities for the 
development of tolerance of opposing views. Therefore here, as to differences between 
Pentecostals and mainline Protestants on levels of political tolerance, I hypothesize that 
Pentecostals are slightly more politically tolerant than mainline Protestants.  
I also hypothesize that Catholics are the most tolerant when compare to mainline and 
Pentecostal Protestants. While identifying with Protestantism, mainline or Pentecostal, most 
likely entails a high degree of devoutness and church attendance, identifying with Catholicism 
does not translate into the same. A great percentage of Catholics are nominal Catholics; in other 
words, they might have been baptized and perhaps even taken the First Communion but they do 
not attend church frequently (Souza 2001). According to data from Pierucci and Prandi (1995), 
only 14 percent of Catholics were also practitioners or active in church activities in 1994.
41
 Data 
from the LAPOP 2010 survey presented on Table 3 shows that this trend still remains amongst 
Catholics. Also, in terms of  importance of religion in ones’ life, Catholics once again show the 
lowest levels of devoutness (presented in chapter 3).  
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 Also, according to Antoniazzi (1989), in 1988, only about 20% of the Catholic population attended mass weekly. 
75 
 
 
Table 3: Church Attendance by Religious Affiliation 
 
 More than 
once a week 
Once a week Once a month Once or twice 
a month 
Never  
Catholic 13.3%` 24.5% 28.4% 18.9% 14.8% 
Mainline 
Protestant 
50% 26% 13.1% 7.0% 3.9% 
Pentecostal  56.9% 23.7% 13% 3.1% 3.4% 
Spiritist 15.4% 36.5% 21.1% 15.4% 11.5% 
Source:LAPOP (2010) 
 
Therefore, because Catholics tend to display the lowest overall levels of religiosity 
amongst the three main religious groups, they are also most likely to display higher levels of 
political tolerance. From this previous discussion the following hypotheses are suggested:  
 
H1: Catholics are more likely to show higher levels of political tolerance than 
Protestants (mainline and Pentecostal).  
H2: Mainline Protestants are likely to show lower levels of political tolerance 
than Pentecostal Protestants.  
 
Political tolerance is just one of indicator of a broad measure of democratic support. 
Often in the literature, we see democratic support being measured by asking questions that tap 
more on the ideals (or overt support) than on the procedures (covert support) that make 
democracy work. When overt measures are applied, support for democracy is found not only in 
democratic regimes but also authoritarian ones (Gibson 1996; Fuchs and Roller 2006; Inglehart 
2003). However, when different indicators measuring the willingness of citizens to extend civil 
liberties to others (including political opponents) are used, support for democracy is not as 
widely found, especially in countries that have a legacy of authoritarianism (Inglehart 2003). 
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Here, both aspects of support for democracy, overt and covert, are used to measure overall 
support for democracy.  
Here I hypothesize that amongst the three main religious groups, Catholics are the most 
supportive of democracy. And this is due to low levels of religiosity Catholics tend to display. As 
to differences between mainline and Pentecostal Protestants, I hypothesize that there are no 
significant differences between the two groups in overall levels of support for democracy. 
Although a lack of systematic knowledge about biblical doctrines might make Pentecostals to be 
more politically tolerant than mainline Protestants, that knowledge should not affect overall 
levels of support for democracy since these two groups display very similar patterns of 
devoutness and church attendance. This similarity in overall levels of religiosity may also 
translate to similar levels of overall support for democracy. Therefore the following hypotheses 
are suggested:  
 
H3: Catholics are more likely to be supportive of an overall indicator of 
democracy than Protestants (mainline and Pentecostal).  
H4: There are no significant differences between mainline and Pentecostal 
Protestants in their support of an overall indicator of democracy.  
 
Although the expectation is to find that there are no significant differences between 
mainline and Pentecostal Protestants in their overall level of support for democracy, the 
relationship between mainline and Pentecostal Protestantism and overall support for democracy 
is, I expect, a positive one. As some have shown, the churches in Latin America have played an 
important role in providing skill-building opportunities for its members (Sinner 2007; Patterson 
204, 2005; Cleary and Steward-Gambino 1997; Camp 1997). In other words, religious affiliation 
and participation have been positively linked to democracy. However, as explained before, 
religion can also have a negative effect on democracy. Religion, thought of as religious beliefs, 
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often has a negative correlation with one of the pillars of democracy – political tolerance. Since 
this seems the only instance where the effects of religion on democracy seem consistent across 
cases, the effects of religion on the other measures of democracy are ambiguous and open for 
debate. Therefore here, I hypothesize that the combination of high levels of church attendance 
and devoutness of members belonging to mainline and Pentecostal Protestant churches makes 
these believers more prone to be supportive of many of the procedures, and perhaps even some 
ideals, that make democracy work.  
 
H5: Mainline and Pentecostal Protestantism are positively correlated to overall 
democratic support.  
 
DATA AND MEASURES  
 
In order to test the suggested hypotheses on the attitudes towards support for democracy 
by the different religious groups, I use the Latin American Public Opinion Project, the Americas 
Barometer (LAPOP) (2010). The following key dependent and independent variables are 
described below.  
 
Dependent variables 
 
Political Tolerance. In order to test the hypotheses on political tolerance, it is important to 
choose a survey question that taps on the practical implications of what it means to be tolerant. 
Authors like Inglehart and Norris have emphasized that the essence of democracy is that not only 
the government but the people tolerate the opposition and also allows it to participate; the crucial 
test democracy takes place when one has to tolerate those they least sympathize or agree with. 
Therefore here, I use two different measures of political tolerance. The first measure, and also 
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the most extreme one, is based on the question dealing with expanding rights to homosexuals to 
participate in politics. I believe this is a good measure of political tolerance in the Brazilian 
context given the country’s historical background and recent developments on gay right issues. 
As a traditionally Catholic country with a somewhat conservative population, most Brazilians 
oppose same-sex marriage.  However, in May of 2011, the Supreme Court passed a law that 
recognized same-sex unions making Brazil the 6
th
 country in Latin America to legalize such 
union.
42
 According to the Brazilian Institute of Opinion and Statistics (IBOPE), 55 percent of 
Brazilians were against the decision of the Supreme Court. It is clear that at least half of the 
population opposes extending marriage rights to homosexuals. Perhaps to many, this is a matter 
of moral issues. However, what about extending strictly political rights to homosexuals? Given 
how Brazilians think of same-sex marriage, asking how they would feel about extending political 
rights to homosexuals can be an adequate measure of political tolerance. The question is the 
following: thinking of homosexuals, how much do you approve or disapprove the right of these 
people to run for public office? Respondents were asked to rate their approval on a scale from 1 
to 10 where 1 stands for strongly disapprove and 10 for strongly approve. The second measure is 
based on Seligson’s (2000) work on democratic stability. A political tolerance scale was built 
using the four following questions: 
1. There are people who only say bad things about the (country) form of 
government, not just the incumbent government but the system of government. 
How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people’s right to vote? 
2. How strongly do you approve or disapprove that such people be allowed to 
conduct peaceful demonstrations in order to express their views? 
3. Still thinking of those who only say bad things about the (country) form of 
government, how strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people being 
permitted to run for public office? 
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 The ruling gives same-sex couples the same legal (financial and social) rights as married heterosexuals. Same-sex 
couples are now able to enjoy the inheritance and pension rights and health plans. The ruling falls short of the 
recognition of same-sex marriage. 
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4. How strongly do you approve or disapprove of such people appearing on 
television to make speeches? 
 
 Respondents were asked to rate their approval on a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 stands for 
strongly disapprove and 10 for strongly approve. 
 
Democratic Government. This variable is based on the responses to the following question: 
which phrase do you agree the most? Respondents were given the following options: (1) In some 
circumstances, an authoritarian government is preferable than a democratic one; (2) To someone 
like me, it doesn’t matter if we have a democracy or not; (3) Democracy is preferable than any 
other type of government.  
 
Democratic Participation. This variable is based on the responses to the following question: Do 
you think that our country needs a government with an iron fist, or that problems can be resolved 
with everyone's participation? The answers were the following: (0) Iron fist; (1) Everyone’s 
participation.  
 
Electoral Democracy. This variable is based on the responses to the following question: There 
are people who say we need a strong leader who does not have to be elected by the vote of the 
people. Others say that although things may not work, electoral democracy, or the popular vote, 
is always best. What do you think? The answers were: (0) We need a strong leader who does not 
have to be elected; (1) Electoral democracy is the best. 
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Overall support for democracy. Using factorial analysis, the three following variables were used 
to create a summary index of support for democracy: democratic government, Democratic 
Participation, and Electoral Democracy.  
 
Independent variables 
 
 All the independent variables used in chapter 3 are also used here.  
 
Results 
 
 The results of all the analyses point to one common pattern: that religiosity has 
differential and overall negative effects on democratic support.  In a nutshell, religiosity, 
measured as religious affiliation and church attendance, is not correlated to any of democratic 
support measures except for political tolerance regarding the right of homosexuals to run for 
office and democratic participation. When measured as devoutness, religiosity has an overall 
negative effect on support for democracy. Religious affiliation and church attendance were 
statistically significant only in the analysis of the determinants of the first measure of political 
tolerance and democratic participation whereas devoutness was statistically significant in all but 
two measures of democratic support (homosexuals’ right and electoral democracy).  
 The results of the analysis displayed on Table 3.2, confirm the expectation of a negative 
relationship between religiosity and the principle of political tolerance based on the idea that 
homosexuals should have the right to run for office. Religious affiliation and church attendance 
were statistically and negatively correlated to political tolerance. While Pentecostalism and 
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mainline Protestantism were negatively correlated to this measure of political tolerance, 
Spiritism’s coefficient pointed to the exact opposite direction. Affiliation with Spiritism makes 
one more likely to agree with the statement that homosexuals should have the right to run for 
office. Based on Table 3.1 of raw percentages, Catholics showed the highest levels of tolerance 
among the three. This was expected since Catholics display the lowest levels of religiosity – 
measured in terms of church attendance and devoutness –among the three groups.  
 
Table 3.1: Raw Percentages on Opinions About Homosexuals’ Right to Run for Office 
 
 Disagree Neutral  Agree 
Catholics 23.7% 18.4% 57.8( 
Pentecostal 34.7% 17.38% 47.9% 
Mainline Protestant 31% 23% 46% 
Spiritist  7.4% 13% 79.6% 
Nonreligious  13.3% 23.3% 63.3% 
Source: LAPOP (2010) 
 
Contrary to the expectation, Pentecostals showed slightly lower levels of political 
tolerance than mainline Protestants. However, a further test, one-way ANOVA, shows that the 
difference in levels of political tolerance between these two is not statistically significant. The 
analysis is displayed on Table 3.3. I expected Pentecostals to show slightly higher levels of 
political tolerance than mainline Protestants due to a lack of systematic theology prevalent in 
many Pentecostal churches; however, as this analysis shows, what distinguishes Pentecostal from 
mainline Protestant churches does not have an impact on its members’ levels of political 
tolerance.  
Church attendance was also negatively correlated to political tolerance. The more often 
one attends church, the more likely he is to disagree with the statement that homosexual should 
have the right to run for office. Here the logic is that the more one attends church, the more 
likely he is to be exposed to messages that support some views and not others. Using the 
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previous example of same-sex marriage, the more one attends church (either Catholic, 
Pentecostal or mainline Protestant), the more likely he is to listen to sermons on the concept of  
 
 
Table 3.2: Opinions on Homosexuals’ Right to Run for Office by Religious Affiliation 
 
 
 
              LAPOP (2010) 
                * significance at .05 level;  
             ** significance at .01 level;  
             *** significance at .001 level 
 
 
 
 
Homosexuals’ 
Right 
 
Pentecostal 
Protestant 
-.711 (.21)*** 
Mainline 
Protestant 
-.644 (21)** 
Spiritist 1.46 (.47)** 
Nonreligious  .449 (.30) 
Church 
Attendance  
-.206 (.06)*** 
Devoutness .099 (.10) 
Income .066 (.04) 
Education .119 (.02)*** 
Age -.015 (.005)** 
Urban -.111 (.20) 
Constant  6.48 (.47)*** 
R
2
 0.06 
N 2144 
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marriage and its practical implications to daily life. By learning what marriage should look like 
according to the bible, anything that does not fit the depiction learned in church may be 
condemned by the believer; therefore, making that believer to be less supportive of marriages 
that are not between a man and woman.  
Regarding the second measure of political tolerance (as displayed on Table 3.4), the only 
statistically relevant religious variable is devoutness. Being affiliated to a religion and attending 
religious services does not affect one’s level of political tolerance. However, the more devout 
one is of his faith, the more likely he is to be politically intolerant.  
Table 3.5 summarizes the findings regarding the effects of religiosity on democratic 
support. According to the models, religiosity was found to be a weak determinant of democratic 
support. The only statistically significant religious affiliation variable in these models was 
Pentecostalism. Affiliation with Pentecostalism makes one less likely to be support of an overall 
measure of democratic support and to agree with the statement that democracy is preferable than 
any other government. Affiliation with mainline Protestantism and Spiritism did not affect the 
any of the measures of democratic support.  
 
Table 3.3: Difference in Levels of Political Tolerance Between Mainline and Pentecostal 
Protestant  
 
DESCRIPTIVES 
 
     95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
  
 N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Error 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Minimum Maximum 
Mainline 
Protestant  
305 5.89 3.42 .196 5.50 6.27 1 10 
Pentecostal  345 5.88 3.25 .175 5.53 6.22 1 10 
Total  650 5.88 3.33 .131 5.63 6.14 1 10 
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ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Between 
Groups  
.017 1 .017 .002 .969 
Within 
Groups 
7209.097 648 11.125   
Total 7209.114 649    
LAPOP (2010) 
 
Table 3.4: Political Tolerance Scale by Religious Affiliation  
 
 
              LAPOP (2010) 
                * significance at .05 level;  
             ** significance at .01 level;  
             *** significance at .001 level 
 
 Political 
Tolerance 
 
Pentecostal 
Protestant 
-.010 (.17) 
Mainline 
Protestant 
-.180 (.17) 
Spiritist .599 (.39) 
Nonreligious .120 (.25) 
Church 
Attendance  
-.021 (.04) 
Devoutness -.285 (.08)*** 
Income .053 (.03) 
Education .091 (.02)*** 
Age -.011 (.004)** 
Urban -.563 (.17)** 
Constant  7.36 (.38)*** 
R
2
 0.04 
N 2127 
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Church attendance was not statistically insignificant either. Attending church did not 
affect the ones’ level of support for the different measures of support for democracy. Devoutness 
was statistically significant in 3 out of the 4 measures of democratic support: overall support for 
democracy, democratic government and democratic participation. In all these relationships, 
devoutness had a negative impact on democracy. The more one values his religion, or the more 
importance one gives to his religious beliefs, the less likely he is to support the overall idea of 
democracy and to agree with  statements that  affirm that “overall, democracy is preferable than 
any other type of government” and “problems are best solved with the everyone’s participation.”  
 
Table 3.5: Democratic Support by Religious Affiliation 
 
 Overall Support for 
Democracy
a 
 
Democratic 
Government
b
 
Democratic 
Participation
c
 
Electoral 
Democracy
c
 
Pentecostal 
Protestant 
-.143 (.07)* -.145 (.14) -.297 (.14)* -.293 (.18) 
Mainline 
Protestant 
.053 (.07) .178 (.16) .093 (.15) .345 (.22) 
Spiritist  .245 (.15) 1.00 (.48)* .724 (.42) .075 (.49) 
Nonreligious -.021 (.10) .064 (.23) -.205 (.22) .031 (.30) 
Church 
Attendance  
-.009 (.02) -.163 (.07) .021 (.04) -.040 (.06) 
Devoutness -.088 (.03)** -.163 (.08)* -.218 (.07)** -.053 (.10) 
Income -.005 (.01) -.015 (.03) .036 (.03) -.031 (.04) 
Education .032 (.007)*** .061 (.06)*** .042 (.01)** .059 (.02)** 
Age .005 (.001)** .011 (.003)** -.004 (.003) .009 (.004) 
Urban -.040 (.07) -.251 (.15) -.323 (.15)* .153 (.18) 
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Constant  -.062 (.16) - 1.65 (.35)*** 1.32 (.47)** 
R
2
 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
N 1856 2001 2122 2101 
LAPOP (2010) 
Note: a: OLS regression; b: Ordered logit analysis; c: Logit analysis  
* significance at .05 level; ** significance at .01 level; *** significance at .001 level 
 
The more devout one is, the more prone he is to believe that an authoritarian government is 
justifiable and that, at times, problems within the state are better solved by strong leaders that 
might not be held accountable to others. 
Overall, religion has a somewhat weak effect on support for democracydemocracy. As all 
the analyses show, the most significant religious variable is devoutness. Being a devout believer 
was statistically significant and negatively correlated to 3 measures of democracy. Religious 
affiliation and church attendance were only statistically significant in relation to the first measure 
of political tolerance and democratic participation. Whereas religion has a weak impact on 
attitudes toward democracy, socioeconomic variables are the best predictors of individuals’ 
perceptions of democracy.  
 
Socioeconomic variables  
 
 Socioeconomic variables turned out to be the best indicators of support for democracy; 
the strongest indicator being education. Education was not only statistically significant across all 
measures of democratic support but it was also positively correlated to all measures. Income was 
not statistically significant in any of the measures of support for democracy. Age was significant 
in 4 out of the 6 models. Urban was only statistically significant in predicting democratic 
participation.  
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In the first model, education is the only statistically significant variable that is positively 
correlated to political tolerance. The more years one has spent in the school system, the more 
likely he is to agree with the statement that homosexuals should have the right to run for public 
office. More years of education also makes on more likely to support the general idea of 
democracy, to agree with the statements that democracy is preferable than any other type of 
government, problems are better solved with everyone’s participation, and a leader elected 
through popular vote is the best alternative. Age was also a strong factor determining attitudes 
toward democracy. In the first model, age appeared as negatively correlated to political 
tolerance. In other words, the older one is, the more likely he is to not agree with the statement 
that homosexuals should have the right to run for public office. In the other models, age was 
positively correlated to democracy. The older one gets, the more likely he is to support the 
overall idea of democracy and to believe that democracy is more preferable than any other 
government.  
The explanatory power of socioeconomic variables predicting political outcomes is not 
new to political scientists. Since Verba and Nie’s (1972) Participation in America, over and over 
again, socioeconomic status has been found to be an important determinant of political 
participation (Milbrath and Goel 1977; Winkler 1981; Verba et al. 1995; Booth and Seligson 
1978). Individuals from higher socioeconomic backgrounds tend to be more politically active 
than individuals from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Therefore, the finding that education 
was a very powerful predictor of attitudes toward democracy amongst Brazilians is not novel. 
  
What about the Spiritists?  
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 In chapter 2, we learned that Spiritists are a unique group, at least in terms of 
socioeconomic status. Spiritists were substantially wealthier and more educated than all other 
members belonging to different religious groups. Because of their uniqueness in socioeconomic 
status, I expected Spiritists to also display a unique pattern of political behavior. However, in 
Chapter 3, the data analysis did not point to the expected patterns; Spiritism was not correlated to 
any of the measures of political participation. In other words, being affiliated with Spiritism did 
not make one more or less likely to engage in politics. Here, I also wanted to analyze the impact 
of Spiritism on attitudes toward democracy to see if, just like in terms of socioeconomic status, 
Spiritists stood out. As the results of the analyses on Table 3.2, 3.4 and 3.5 show, Spiritism is 
only statistically relevant predicting support for the first measure of political tolerance.  
In the first model measuring support for homosexuals’ right to run for office, Spiritism 
appears as one of two variables that is statistically and positively correlated to political tolerance 
(the other one being education). The coefficient displayed on Table 3.2 suggests that being a 
Spiritist makes one more likely to approve of the right of homosexuals to run for public office; 
which in turn, also leads to the assumption that  Spiritists are more politically tolerant than the 
other religious groups represented in the first model.  
 On Table 3.5, Spiritism is only statistically correlated to one measure of democratic 
support. Spiritism is positively correlated to the measure of democratic government indicating 
that those that identify with Spiritism are likely to think of democracy as the most preferable type 
of government. However, the statistical significance of this variable is at 0.5 level which 
translates into a weak relationship between the dependent and independent variable.  
 On Chapter 2, Spiritists stood out in terms of their socioeconomic status. Here, they stand 
out in their support for political tolerance when measured in terms of support for homosexuals’ 
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right to run for office. Spiritism was the only statistically significant religious variable that was 
positively related to the first measure of political tolerance. While all other religious variables 
had a negative effect on the likelihood of being political tolerant of homosexuals running for 
office, Spiritism stands out for its positive relationship.  
CONCLUSION  
 
 The goal of this chapter was to analyze the impact of religiosity on attitudes toward 
democracy. What has become clear is that religion has a differential effect on individuals’ 
perceptions of democracy.  Out of the three different religion variables, only devoutness showed 
statistical relevance across models. As expected, the more one values his religion, or the more 
importance one gives to his religious beliefs, the less likely he is to hold strong democratic 
values. Amongst the religious affiliation variables, Pentecostalism and Spiritism were the most 
important ones. While all religious affiliation variables had statistical significance when 
predicting the first measure of political tolerance, they all lose statistical significance in the 
second model of political tolerance. Also, while devoutness did not have an effect on the 
likelihood of one being more favorable or not of homosexuals’ right to run for office, it did when 
predicting a broader syndrome of political tolerance. However, the effect was a negative one 
where the more devout one is the more likely he is to be politically intolerant. Regarding the 
second set of models on attitudes toward democracy, Pentecostalism and Spiritism are the only 
statistically significant variables measuring religious affiliation. While being affiliated with 
Pentecostalism makes one less likely to be supportive of an overall measure of democratic 
support and agreeing with the statement that problems are best solve with the participation of 
everyone, being affiliated with Spiritism makes one more likely to agree with the statement that 
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democracy is the most preferable type of government. Although one might be tempted to 
conclude that Pentecostalism and Spiritism are strong determinants of one’s support for 
democratic values, it is important to note that although these relationships were statistically 
significant, they were weak since they were at the .05 level.  
The strongest indicators predicting support for democracy were those related to one’s 
socioeconomic background; more specifically here, education. Education was statistically 
correlated to 4 out of the 5 different measures of support for democracy. In addition, in all of 
those relationships, education had a positive impact on the dependent variable. In other words, 
the more educated were more likely to be more political tolerant and supportive of democracy 
than the less educated.  
 Religion has shown to have differential and overall negative effects on attitudes toward 
democracy. Devoutness stands out as the most important religious variable since it was 
statistically significant not only predicting political tolerance (political tolerance scale) but also 
two measures of democratic support. However, as it has been the case with most empirical 
research predicting political outcomes, here also, socioeconomic status was the most powerful 
factor determining individuals’ perceptions on democracy. Education was not only statistically 
significant across all models and measures but also, more interestingly, was positively related to 
all outcomes. The more educated one is, the more likely he is to, overtly and covertly, support 
democracy.  
 What we have learned from this chapter is that religion does not act as a uniform agent. 
As Bloom and Arikan (2012) have pointed out, religion is a double-edged sword since it can be 
both, a challenger and a booster of democracy. Here, in the case of Brazil, religion seems to 
function more as a challenger than as a force driving democracy. And as the number of 
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Pentecostals continues to grow, political scientists should keep their eyes focused on the possible 
consequences the movement brings to the political sphere.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
 
 The purpose of this dissertation was to shed light on the impact that the wave of 
Pentecostalism has had on individuals’ political behavior and attitudes in the Brazilian context. 
While many authors have paid attention to what seems to be the aggregate-level consequences of 
the movement, such as electoral outcomes and the party system, the literature lacks an analysis 
of the consequences of the phenomenon at individual-level. This dissertation sought to fill this 
gap in the literature. In this chapter I discuss the findings of this dissertation.  
 
PENTECOSTALS AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS  
 One of the common assumptions about Pentecostals is that they tend to be the most 
disenfranchised in society, or the poorest and less educated citizens.  The analysis of chapter 2 
confirms this expectation but also points to the finding that Pentecostals are not the most 
disenfranchised religious group in society; instead, Catholics are. Catholics are the poorest and 
least educated amongst the main religious groups in Brazil. Pentecostals rank second on the list 
of most disenfranchised religious group but only by a marginal advantage over Catholics. On the 
other side of the spectrum, Spiritists were found to be the most better off religious group. The 
majority of Spiritists earn double the income of the majority of Catholics, Afro, mainline 
Protestants, and Pentecostals. They are also highly educated. While 26 percent of Spiritists have 
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at least some college experience, the percentage of Catholics, mainline Protestants, and 
Pentecostals that have the same experience is 28.3 percent combined.  
 These findings suggest that although Pentecostals do conform to the expected 
socioeconomic patterns described in previous literature, they are not unique. Or in other words, 
Pentecostals are not the most disenfranchised religious group in society. Another important 
finding is also that being poor and less educated is not a trait belonging to religious individuals. 
The nonreligious are also largely poor and less educated. Over 50 percent of nonreligious 
individuals earn less than twice the minimum wage monthly and approximately 46 percent have 
a middle school diploma as their highest educational achievement. Therefore, nonreligious and 
religious individuals have very similar socioeconomic backgrounds. We can conclude from this 
that being poor and less educated is the common profile of the average Brazilian.  
 
 
PENTECOSTALISM AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR  
 
 Most often in the literature focusing on religion and politics, one finds that religion does 
impact political outcomes. Here too, the findings point to this assumption. Religion does play a 
role in Brazilian politics, however, not as one might have expected. The key religious variable in 
this dissertation, Pentecostalism, was not found to be an important predictor of political 
outcomes. Overall, being affiliated to the Pentecostal church did not make one more or less 
likely to be engaged in politics. In the analysis of how religion affects political behavior in 
chapter 3, Pentecostalism was statistically significant in only one of the six models. The results 
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of that sole model showed that affiliation with Pentecostalism increased one’s likelihood of 
working for a political party or candidate during presidential elections.  
 While Pentecostalism was correlated to one political activity only, mainline Protestantism 
was correlated to three of the six political activities included in the analysis also making mainline 
Protestants the most politically active citizens. Being part of a mainline Protestant church 
increased one’s likelihood of working for a political candidate or party during presidential 
elections, engaging in political persuasion, and helping their communities to address pressing 
needs. Catholicism was not statistically correlated to any of the measures of political activities.  
 The strongest predictors of political engagement were socioeconomic variables. Income 
and education were statistically correlated to the same three political activities. The higher one’s 
income and education levels are, the more likely he is to engage in community projects, to be 
part of protest demonstrations and to be interested in politics.  
 
PENTECOSTALS AND DEMOCRATIC SUPPORT  
 
 Chapter 4 was dedicated to understanding the relationship between religion and 
democratic support. Previous authors have examined this link extensively and one common 
understanding is that religion can function as a two-edged sword. On one hand, religion may be 
seen as incomparable with democracy since religion is about absolutes and democracy is about 
tolerance and compromises. On the other, participation in religious activities is often correlated 
to support for democracy. The logic behind this latter argument is that involvement in religious 
activities teaches one appreciation for democratic values.  
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 Using three different measures of religiosity the results of the analysis in chapter 4 
confirm the overall expectation that religion has differential effects on political outcomes. 
Religious affiliation and church attendance were statistically significant in three one of the six 
the models. Religious affiliation and church attendance were statistically correlated to the first 
measure of political tolerance where being part of a church and attending religious services 
increases one’s likelihood of disaproving homosexuals’ right to run for public office. While 
religious affiliation and church attendance were not strong predictors of the measures of 
democratic support, devoutness, or how important one’s religion is, stood out as the most 
relevant religious variable. Devoutness was statistically significant in four of the six models. The 
more importance one gives to his religion the more likely he is to display lower levels of overall 
support for democracy, to disagree with the statements that democracy is preferable than any 
type of government and that problems are best solved with the participation of everyone.  
 One of the main expectations not fulfilled on chapter 4 was to find that at least one of the 
aspects of religion, especially church attendance, would have a positive impact on democratic 
support. Contrary to expectation, all statistically significant religion variables were negatively 
correlated to the different measures of democratic support, except for Spiritism. Spiritism was 
statistically significant in two of the six models. Being affiliated with Spiritism greatly increased 
one’s likelihood of being more politically tolerant of the idea of homosexuals’ right to run for 
office and also agreeing with statement that democracy is preferable to any other government. 
 Similar to the analysis between religion and political behavior on chapter 3, here too, the 
strongest predictors of democratic attitudes were related to one’s socioeconomic background. 
Education was statistically significant in 4 of the 5 models. In addition, in all of these models 
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education a positive impact on the dependent variable. Therefore, the more educated one is the 
more likely he is to support democratic principles.  
 
 
DIIFERENT RELIGIONS, DIFFERENT POLITICS  
 
 Another expectation of this dissertation was to confirm what Patterson (2005) called 
“different religions, different politics” thesis. Patterson’s idea is that different religions can 
results in different politics. The logic is that different religions, and most specifically in his 
analysis Catholicism and Protestantism, differ in a number of basic doctrines and practices such 
as levels of church attendance, time devoted to bible reading, and role of the clergy in a way that 
may result in different political attitudes and behavior. The findings of this dissertation do not 
confirm this expectation; different religions did not result in different politics.  
 There were no major differences in political behavior and democratic support between 
believers belonging to the three main religious groups; the differences were mostly in degree, not 
of kind. Catholics, mainline Protestants, and Pentecostals were mostly apolitical. However, 
mainline Protestants are slightly more politically active than Pentecostals and Catholics. 
Catholics were the least politically active.  
 Although there were no major differences in political outcomes between the main 
religious groups, when Spiritism is added to the equation we do see a glimpse of the “different 
religions, different politics” pattern described by Patterson. Although Spiritism was not 
statistically correlated to any of the measures of political behavior, it was statistically significant 
in predicting two measures of democratic support. Unlike the other religion variables that had a 
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negative effect on political outcomes, Spiritism had a positive effect on democratic support. In 
other words, while all other religion variables are negatively correlated to support for the 
democracy, Spiritism is the only religion variable that has a positive effect on one’s likelihood of 
supporting democratic principles.  
 The general conclusion from this study is that although Pentecostals have been on the 
spotlight for its unforeseen growth, they are not special political actors. Or at least, not yet. So 
far they do not exhibit a unique way of participating in politics nor do they conceive democracy 
differently from the rest of the population.  
 
THE FUTURE OF RELIGION IN POLITICS 
 
 In the past few decades, the rapid growth of the number of Pentecostals has been a hot 
topic. After all, the country had never experienced such a Protestant presence. Protestants now 
own TV and radio stations, newspapers, and very profitable businesses. It seems they are 
spreading out very quickly throughout all segments of society. In the political realm, the 
Protestant block (or Bancada evangélica) has attracted much attention since in terms of numbers 
of representatives (the total number of Protestant elected officials represents 13.2% of the total 
number of seats in Congress), they are, presently, only behind the PT and PMDB political 
parties.  
 Intuitively, one may explain the success of the Bancada evangélica by pointing to the 
evangelico voter effort to elect those candidates that indentify with the Protestant faith. One is 
inclined to believe that the uniqueness of the presence of evangélicos in power is translated to a 
uniqueness of patterns of political participation by Pentecostal Protestants. However, this 
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dissertation has shown that Protestants, mainline and Pentecostals, are not unique political actors. 
Once again, there were no major differences in political engagement between members 
belonging to three major religious groups (Catholics included).  And when there were small 
differences in patterns of political behavior, religion often had a negative impact on political 
outcomes. Therefore, although at the aggregate level Pentecostalism has shown its political 
strength, at the individual level, Pentecostalism has not created special political actors.  
While many foresee that the number of Pentecostals will continue to grow, and perhaps 
even surpass the number of Catholics, others like Paul Freston, a specialist on Latin American 
religion and politics, believes that Brazil will not become a Protestant country. Freston believes 
that the number of nonreligious individuals will outpace the number of Protestants in the future. 
Since predicting the future is a task that many choose to not undertake, as this group continues to 
grow in number we, political scientists, should keep an eye on them and on the developments 
this movement may bring to the political realm.  
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